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Illinois' New Legal Ethics Rules: A Disappointing Travail,
A Lesson for All, and Their Impact on the Practice
of Business and Commercial Law
Steven H. Resnicoff*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Illinois business and commercial law attorneys must comply with
legal ethics rules designed not only to promote the public interest in
the efficient and effective administration of justice, but also to protect
clients and other participants in the justice system. Whether an attorney engages in private practice, serves the public as an employee of a
government or non-profit entity, or works as in-house counsel, these
rules pervasively affect his professional activities, including his relationships with adversaries, employees, colleagues, judges, witnesses,
and, of course, clients. Mastering these rules is essential to an attorney's success at advancing his client's and his firm's interests, while
protecting himself from possibly devastating disciplinary sanctions.
Prior to January 1, 2010, Illinois attorneys were obligated to comply

with the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct ("IRPC"). Effective
January 1, 2010, the IRPC was replaced by the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010,1 pursuant to an Illinois Supreme Court order
issued on July 1, 2009. This action, which constituted the first major
overhaul of Illinois' legal ethics rules since 1990,2 was the culmination
of over a decade of work by a variety of distinguished and well-intentioned actors and institutions. Nevertheless, the procedure was fundamentally flawed. It produced a variety of new rules that are either
morally questionable or materially unclear, further burdening the
practice of commercial law. It also failed to provide answers for many
of the modern ethical issues that confront commercial lawyers.
* Professor, DePaul University College of Law; Co-Director, DePaul College of Law Center
for Jewish Law & Judaic Studies; Wicklander Chair for Business and Professional Ethics (200001); B.A., Princeton College; J.D., Yale Law School. I sincerely thank the DePaul University
College of Law for the financial support that allowed me to write this paper and my research
assistants, Brian Bacher and Sean Lipkin, for their excellent assistance.
1. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2010), available at http://www.state.il.us/court/Supreme
Court/Rules/Amend/2009/070109.pdf.
2. See ARDC Clerk's Office, Filings and Public Hearings (showing a "Redline Comparison"
of the 1990 Rules to the New Rules), https://www.iardc.org[Redline%20Version%20of%
201990%2ORules.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
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The process producing the new rules inexplicably proceeded at a
snail's pace. It was a process in which the principal participants systematically shirked the moral responsibility for the rules proposed,
misrepresented (and perhaps importantly misunderstood) the significance of the proposals, and failed adequately to document the rationales for their adoption. Part II examines and criticizes this process.
The proposals themselves almost studiously avoided addressing many
of the most vexing, pervasive, and long-standing of legal ethics issues
as well as virtually all of the modern issues that have been addressed
by the legal ethics opinions in various jurisdictions throughout the
past ten years. Moreover, in a number of instances, the rules represent unjustifiably low ethical standards. Part III focuses on these
substantive sins of omission and commission. Part IV highlights the
process' failure to suggest any of a number of additional innovations
that could have substantially improved the Illinois legal ethics system.
By identifying and discussing the shortcomings in the Illinois experience, this article aspires to assist other jurisdictions to avoid these pitfalls. Finally, Part V highlights a few of the less problematic changes
which, nonetheless, are of especial practical importance for attorneys.
II.

THE PROCESS PRODUCING THE RULES

The process leading to the new Illinois ethics rules entailed an enormous amount of work by many exceptionally dedicated and capable
people. Nevertheless, the process failed in several significant respects.
First, it took a very long time - far too long, especially in light of the
relatively little good that it accomplished. 3 Second, it largely avoided
moral responsibility for the rules that were adopted, deferring, instead, to the previous work of the American Bar Association. Third,
it misrepresented the extent to which, and the ways in which, the new
rules, and the comments adopted with them, constitute a change from
the former Illinois ethics rules. Finally, the process produced a dismally poor historical record regarding the ethical pros and cons of
many of the decisions that were explicitly or implicitly made.

3. In 2003, when a Joint Committee published its Final Report, its chairs authored an article
entitled An Introduction to the New Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. See Robert A.
Creamer & Thomas P. Luning, An Introduction to the New Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, CHI. BAR Ass'N REC., Nov. 2003, at 25, 25. This title was overly optimistic. Not all of these
proposed rules were ultimately adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court, and even those that were
adopted would not become effective until January 1, 2010.
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A Snail's Pace

The new rules are largely a response to the work of the American
Bar Association's Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Pro4
fessional Conduct, known as the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission,
which was formed in 1997. 5 The Ethics 2000 Commission submitted
its final report to the ABA House of Delegates in May 2001, which
approved virtually all of the report's recommended changes to the
ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct at meetings in August
2001 and February 2002.6 The House adopted additional changes regarding multijurisdictional practice, confidentiality, and entity repre7
sentation at meetings in August 2002 and August 2003.
In September 1999, even before the ABA Commission's final report
was submitted, the Illinois State Bar Association ("ISBA") created a
Special Committee on Ethics 2000 to monitor the Commission's work
and to evaluate possible changes to the Illinois Rules." In November
2002, the ISBA and the Chicago Bar Association ("CBA") agreed to
pursue this project through a Joint ISBA-CBA Committee on Ethics
2000 (the "Joint Committee"). 9 The Joint Committee issued an initial
"Final Report" to the ISBA and CBA on October 17, 2003.10 The
Final Report, including a black-line copy of the proposed new rules,
was posted on the ISBA and CBA websites.1 1 Those sites explained
how people could submit comments on the report and the proposed
rules. The Final Report was presented to the ISBA General Assembly
at its November 7, 2003, mid-year meeting. 12 The Assembly voted to
allow the ISBA Board of Governors to vote on the report at its January 2004 meeting, but not to schedule a vote by the ISBA Assembly
until June 2004.13 Announcements in the ISBA's Bar News and the
CBA's E-News Bulletin solicited comments on the report and its pro4. For information regarding the Ethics 2000 Commission, see Am. Bar Ass'n. Ctr. for Prof'l
Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Commission, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/
home.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2010).
5. Letter of Richard A. Redmond, Chair of the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Professional Ethics, to John Nicoara, Chair of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee (Feb. 20,
2007), at 4, available at http://www2.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourtlPublicHearings/Rules/2007/
ProfRespReport.pdf.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Robert A. Creamer & Thomas P. Luning, ProposedNew Rules of Professional Conductfor
Illinois Lawyers, 92 ILL. B.J. 306, 306 (2004).
9. Id.
10. Redmond, supra note 5, at 10.
11. Redmond, supra note 5, at 2.
12. Redmond, supra note 5, at 2.
13. Kelley Quinn, State Bar Votes to Go Slow on Ethics Proposal,CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov.
10, 2003, at 1.
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posal by the end of December 2003.14 The proposed rules were the
subject of the CBA Young Lawyers' Section Seminar on December
16, 2003.15 An article describing the Joint Committee's work and rec16
ommendations was published in the November 2003 CBA Record.
A Revised Final Report, responding to the input received from various sources, was issued on January 8, 2004, and a Corrected Revised
Final Report was issued on April 1, 2004 (hereafter the "Corrected
17
Final Report").
The Board of Managers of the CBA approved the Committee's Revised Final Report on January 15, 2004.18 On March 26, 2004, the
ISBA Board of Governors voted to recommend to the ISBA Assembly that it adopt the report, and, on June 19, 2004, the ISBA Assembly
did so unanimously. 19 Another article about the Joint Committee's
proposals appeared in the ISBA Journal in June 2004,20 and, on June
19, 2004, the ISBA Assembly unanimously approved it.21 Thus, approval by the CBA Board of Managers and the ISBA Board of Governors both preceded issuance of the Corrected Final Report on April 1,
2004. Neither articles by the Chairs of the Joint Committee, nor a
letter by then Chair of the Supreme Court Committee on Professional
Responsibility, indicates whether either of these bodies ever formally
22
acted on the Corrected Final Report.
On April 30, 2004, even before approval by the ISBA Assembly, the
Corrected Final Report was submitted to the Illinois Supreme
Court,23 which, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 3,24 referred it to the
Committee on Professional Responsibility. The Committee on Professional Responsibility began its review of the Corrected Final Re14. Id.
15. Redmond, supra note 5, at 10.
16. Creamer & Luning, supra note 8, at 306.

17. ISBA-CBA JOINT COMM. ON ETHics 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT (2004), available
at http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Public-Hearings/Rules/2007/ISBACBAFinal
Report.pdf (corrected Apr. 1, 2004). None of the materials on the websites of the Illinois Supreme Court or the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission describe the
differences between the ISBA-CBA Revised Final Report and the ISBA-CBA Corrected Final
Report.
18. Creamer & Luning, supra note 8, at 306. It is unclear to the author whether the CBA
Board of Managers took any formal action with respect to the Special Committee's Corrected
Final Report issued on April 1, 2004.
19. Redmond, supra note 5, at 10.
20. Creamer & Luning, supra note 8.
21. Redmond, supra note 5, at 10.
22. See generally Redmond, supra note 5; Creamer & Luning, supra note 8.
23. Redmond, supra note 5. The Redmond Letter never mentions the fact that a Corrected
Final Report was ever issued. Nevertheless, the version of the Revised Final Report that is on
the ARDC website, along with the Redmond Letter, indicates that it was corrected on April 1,
2004.
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port at its October 7, 2005 meeting. 25 The Committee on Professional
Responsibility reviewed the Report throughout eleven additional
meetings through January 26, 2007.26 On February 20, 2007, the then
Chair of that Committee submitted a letter to the Chair of the Illinois
Supreme Court Rules Committee announcing that it had completed a
"careful[ ] review[ ]" of the Corrected Final Report, presumably referring to the Corrected Final Report, and making recommendations
27
with respect to the various proposed changes in the ethics rules.
The Supreme Court Rules Committee held a public hearing on the
proposal submitted by the Committee on Professional Responsibility
on September 14, 2007.28 An additional hearing was held on October
24, 2008, to consider revisions to proposed new rules 1.0, 1.8 and 5.7,
as well as to consider proposed revisions, based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Dowling v. Chicago Options Associates, Inc.,29 to
rules 1.15 and 1.16.30 After one or both of these hearings, the Committee on Professional Responsibility may have provided additional
input to the Rules Committee, but no other written statements by that
Committee appear to be available on the Illinois Supreme Court website. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the new rules on July 1,
2009, effective January 1, 2010.31 Thus, a proposal unanimously
adopted by the ISBA Assembly and submitted to the Illinois Supreme
Court in April 2004 gave rise to the adoption of rules - not all, of
course, exactly as proposed - first effective more than five-and-a-half
years later.
A variety of factors complicates, and renders inexact, any comparison between the responses of different states to the work of the
ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission. Nevertheless, it is at least notewor24. See generally The Process of a Proposed Supreme Court Rule, http://www.state.il.us/
COURT/SupremeCourt/Rules/Process.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) (describing the Illinois Supreme Court's rule-making process and illustrating the process with a flow-chart).
25. Redmond, supra note 5, at 3.
26. Redmond, supra note 5, at 3.
27. Redmond, supra note 5, at 3.
28. See generally Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee Public Hearings - September 14,
2007, http://www.state.il.us/court/supremeCourt/Public-Hearings/Rules/2007/Rules-Comm/
091407.asp (last visited Dec. 22, 2010) (providing links to the agenda for that hearing, to the
ISBA-CBA Joint Comm. on Ethics 2000, Corrected Final Report, and to the Committee on
Professional Responsibility's Report).
29. Dowling v. Chi. Options Assoc., Inc., 875 N.E.2d 1012 (Il1. 2007).
30. See generally Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee Public Hearings - October 24,
2008, http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourtlPublicHearings/Rules/2008/102408.asp (last
visited Dec. 22, 2010) (providing links to the agenda for that hearing and to proposals by the
Committee on Professional Responsibility and the Illinois Attorney Registration and Discipli-

nary Commission).
31. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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thy that forty-one of the other forty-nine states responded by revising
their ethics rules earlier than Illinois, 32 and thirty-two of the forty-one
33
implemented their changes two or more full years before Illinois.
Rendering the Illinois delay less explicable is the fact that the Joint

Committee "determined early in its deliberations that it would recommend adoption of each ABA Model Rule and its Comments unless
there was a compelling reason (major policy considerations, typically
positions previously expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court) not to
do so."'34 Choosing this standard, while itself a questionable decision,
as will be discussed below, dramatically reduced the difficulty of the

Joint Committee's task. Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court's Committee on Professional Responsibility limited its task when it "decided

not to reinvent the wheel" and "proceeded by assuming that the individual rule recommendations contained in the ISBA/CBA Ethics 2000
'35
Report were valid."

Part of the delay seems attributable to the fact that the Joint Committee and the Committee on Professional Responsibility seem to
have worked in tandem. Given the apparent early decision to model

the new proposals on the recommendations of the ABA's Ethics 2000
Commission, it is unclear why these two entities could not have
worked more cooperatively or concurrently.
In addition, there are several seemingly unnecessary and significant
temporal gaps in the process. Although the Corrected Final Report of
the ISBA-CBA Joint Committee was forwarded to the Illinois Su32. See generally ABA, Status of State Review of Professional Conduct Rules, http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/pic/ethics_2000_statuschart.pdf (providing a chart with information on a stateby-state basis). The following jurisdictions, in addition to Illinois, approved significant revisions
based on the ABA's Ethics 2000 Project, and, in each case, the effective date of the most significant of those changes is indicated in parentheses: Alabama (eff. 6/23/08), Alaska (eff. 04/15/09),
Arizona (eff. 12/01/03), Arkansas (eff. 05/01/05), Colorado (eff. 01/01/08), Connecticut (eff. 01/
01/07), Delaware (eff. 07/01/03), District of Columbia (eff. 02/01/07), Florida (eff. 05/22/06),
Idaho (eff. 07/01/04), Indiana (eff. 01/01/05), Iowa (eff. 07/01/05), Kansas (eff. 07/01/07), Kentucky (eff. 07/15/09), Louisiana (eff. 03/01/04), Maine (eff. 08/01/09), Maryland (eff. 07/01/05),
Minnesota (eff. 10/01/05), Mississippi (eff. 11/03/05), Missouri (eff. 07/01/07), Montana (eff. 04/
01/04), Nebraska (eff. 09/01/05), Nevada (eff. 05/01/06), New Hampshire (eff. 01/01/08), New
Jersey (eff. 01/01/04), New Mexico (eff. 11/02/08), New York (eff. 04/01/09), North Carolina (eff.
03/01/03), North Dakota (eff. 08/01/06), Ohio (eff. 02/01/07), Oklahoma (eff. 01/01/08), Oregon
(eff. 01/01/05), Pennsylvania (eff. 01/01/05), Rhode Island (eff. 04/15/07), South Carolina (eff. 10/
01/05), South Dakota (eff. 01/01/04), Utah (eff. 11/01/05), Vermont (eff. 09/01/09), Virginia (eff.
01/01/04), Washington (eff. 09/01/06), Wisconsin (eff. 07/01/07), Wyoming (eff. 07/01/06). The
chart shows that the eight states that did not revise their ethics rules before Illinois were California, Georgia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia. Id.
33. Id.
34. Creamer & Luning, supra note 8, at 306.
35. Redmond, supra note 5, at 3.
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preme Court on April 30, 2004,36 the Supreme Court's Committee on
Professional Responsibility did not begin to review the report until
October 7,2005, more than seventeen months later. 37 Similarly, although the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Responsibility
submitted its own proposals to the Supreme Court Rules Committee
by letter of February 20, 2007,38 no hearings on this proposal were
held for almost a full seven months, on September 14, 2007. 39 The
Supreme Court's rule-making procedures provide that, other than on
a fixed hearing date, hearings are to be scheduled "with 60 days' notice to the bench, bar, and public."'40 Given the extended period of
time during which public and professional attention had already been
focused on the proposed ethics rules prior to February, 2007, this
41
seven month delay seems excessive.
B.

Shirked Responsibility

Second, and quite apart from the problem of its pace, the process
permitted the principal players to avoid, to a great degree, apparent
moral responsibility for the rules they proposed. Instead of exercising
independent ethical judgment regarding the propriety of each rule,
both the Joint Committee and the Committee on Professional Responsibility deferred to the ABA Model Rules by declaring they
would follow them except where there was a "compelling reason" not
to do so. 42 The Committees failed to enumerate the criteria that
would be applied to determine whether a particular reason, or groups
of reasons, would be considered "compelling. ' 43 The closest that the
ISBA-CBA Corrected Final Report came was when it said that deviations from the ABA Model Rules or Comments were "typically
[where] positions previously expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court
...compelled specific changes. '44 One gets the feeling that these ex36. Id. at 10.
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id.
39. See generally The Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee Public Hearings - Archive,
http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourtPublic_- Hearings[RulesArchives.asp (last visited Dec.
22, 2010) (showing no public hearings on the ethics rules proposals between February 20, 2007,
and September 14, 2007).
40. The Process of a Proposed Supreme Court Rule, supra note 24.
41. By contrast, after the Joint Committee released its initial "Final Report" in October 2003,
it asked for comments to be submitted on or before December 2003, a much shorter time frame.
Redmond, supra note 5, at 10.
42. ISBA-CBA JOINT COMM. ON ETHics 2000, CORRECrED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at

8-9.
43. Id. at 8.

44. Id. (emphasis added).
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pressions by the Illinois Supreme Court were regarded almost as a
nuisance that prevented the easier, verbatim adoption of the ABA
Model Rules and Comments.
This standard, by its clear terms, would permit the proposal of an
ABA rule that was less than ethically optimal so long as there was no
"compelling" reason to the contrary. A good reason for rejecting the
rule, but one that is not quite "compelling," would not be enough.
Interestingly, however, the Committees' reports do not reveal
whether such a situation ever arose; the reports never expressly identify any proposed rule as being less than ideal. 45 Of course, adoption
of this "follow the ABA unless there is a compelling reason not to"
standard may have had the practical effect of stifling discussion of
many provisions except in the rare instances in which someone raised
what he or she felt might be a compelling objection. Anyone with an
objection that he or she did not regard as "compelling" may simply
have refrained from raising the issue. If this was the case, the Committees' work seems to have been insufficiently thorough, and their
snail's pace even less defensible.
In attempting to justify the decision to follow the ABA Model
Rules absent a compelling reason not to do so, both the Joint Committee and the Committee on Professional Responsibility cited three con-

siderations. First, they asserted that the ABA Model Rules "are the
de facto national standard for ethics rules," citing among other things,
that candidates for admission to the Illinois bar must know the ABA
Model Rules in order to take the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam (MPRE).46 This argument, of course, begs the question: the
practice of admitting students based on their knowledge of the ABA
Model Rules rather than their knowledge of the Illinois ethics rules
has always seemed somewhat absurd. One could perhaps justify the
Multistate Bar Examination (MBE), which deals with substantive law
issues, by arguing that it is a proxy to see if the applicant has learned

basic legal principles and rules. Someone capable of mastering this
material could be presumed capable of learning Illinois substantive
law on a case by case basis while she practices. Knowledge of criti45. In various places, the ISBA-CBA Joint Committee on Ethics 2000, Corrected Final Report
mentions that there is no compelling reason to deviate from the ABA Model Preamble or Rules.
See id. at 11, 12, 26, 34, 35, 36, 37. Nevertheless, in none of these instances does the Report state
that a different rule would be preferable. Perhaps this is not so surprising after all. Political
realities might have made it awkward at best for the Report to specifically acknowledge that a
particular proposed rule was less than ethically optimal.
46. See ISBA-CBA JOINT COMM. ON ETHics 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note
17, at 5.
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cally important Illinois substantive law is in any event tested in the
essay portion of the bar exam.
If, however, the purpose of the ethics test were simply to test an
applicant's training, the ethics test could simply be included as part of
the MBE. There would be no need for the national ethics rules to be
tested by a separate multiple-choice exam or for it to be tested so
much more thoroughly than any other MBE topic. Indeed, the real
purpose of a separate, extensive test regarding legal ethics ought to be
to ensure that an applicant is already satisfactorily conversant with
applicable ethics rules. Ethics issues are often subtle. Neither they
nor their proper resolutions are always intuitively obvious. Because
inexperienced attorneys may not be adequately sensitive to the existence of ethics issues, we cannot assume that they will learn "the ethics law" simply by practicing law. We need to ensure that they know
the applicable ethics laws before they start practicing. As a result, it
makes little sense to admit an applicant who knows the ABA Model
Rules but not the Illinois Rules. After all, an Illinois attorney who
complies with the ABA Rules, but violates the applicable Illinois
47
Rules, can be suspended or disbarred.
The Joint Committee and the Committee on Professional Responsibility also asserted that the practice of law was increasingly an interstate and multistate business and argued that following the ABA
Model Rules would have the salutary effect of achieving a "higher
level of uniformity and consistency with the rules other jurisdictions."'4 8 This is the type of efficiency argument once advanced for
adoption of uniform commercial laws and, of course, is to some extent
valid. But the argument ignores the possibility that ethics rules may
importantly differ from commercial law and ethical sensitivities and
consensus may differ from state to state. Similarly, the argument
seems to disregard the effectiveness of Rule 8.5,49 a conflict of law
47. For example, ABA Model Rule 1.6 does not require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation of a client even if doing so is obviously necessary to save a life. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003). Illinois Rule 1.6 requires such a disclosure. ILL.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010). Similarly, Model Rule 8.3 does not allow a lawyer to
report another lawyer's wrongdoing if this means disclosing information relating to the representation of a client, yet Illinois Rule 1.6 (and its predecessor) requires such reporting so long as it
does not involve disclosure of information protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege.
See, e.g., David Logan, Upping the Ante: Curricularand Bar Exam Reform in Professional Responsibility, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1023 (1999) (arguing that states should test an applicant's
knowledge of the states' own ethics rules on the "essay" portions of the states' respective bar
exams).

48. ISBA-CBA JOINT COMM. ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at
5; Redmond, supra note 5, at 7.
49. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b) (2010).
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provision, to resolve or at least minimize "problems" that might arise
from lack of uniform state rules.
The supposition that the use of common language will result in
commonly interpreted rules is somewhat curious in the context of Illinois professional responsibility law, which has not always followed the
ABA's apparent construction of words originating from the ABA. In
re Himmel50 is one of the most famous - and, according to some, infamous - Illinois legal ethics decisions. It involved events that transpired in 1983. The Illinois Supreme Court found that Himmel, an
Illinois attorney, had obtained information about another Illinois attorney's conversion of a client's funds and failed to relate that information to the Illinois Attorney Registration & Disciplinary
Commission ("ARDC"). 51 It found that this failure was a violation of
Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 1-103(a), which stated, "(a) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of [Disciplinary] Rule 1102(a)(3) or (4) shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other
'52
authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.
The Court's decision turned on the interpretation of the word "unprivileged" or the phrase "unprivileged knowledge." Himmel argued
that the phrase included not only "client confidences" (i.e., information that would be protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege), but also "client secrets" (i.e., "information gained in the
professional relationship, that the client has requested be held inviolate or the revelation of which would be embarrassing to or would
likely be detrimental to the client"). 53 Himmel argued that his knowledge was at least a "client secret" and, therefore, his knowledge was
"privileged knowledge" which DR 1-103(a) did not obligate him to
54
disclose.
The Court ruled against Himmel, holding that only client confidences were privileged. 55 By contrast, client secrets were "unprivileged knowledge" that had to be disclosed.5 6 The Court
57
suspended Himmel from the practice of law for one year.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988).
Id. at 791.
Id. at 793.
Id. at 793-95.
Id. at 792-93.
In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 795-96.

56. Id. at 794-95.
57. Id. at 796.
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Perhaps curiously, the Court never even mentioned ABA Formal
Opinion 341,58 which was issued on September 30, 1975, long before
the 1983 events in the Hirmmel case. ABA Formal Opinion 341 interpreted the scope of an attorney's obligation under DR 7-102(B) of the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which stated:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client
to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except
59
when the information is protected as a privileged communication.
The Opinion ruled that a client secret, as well as a client confidence,
was a "privileged communication." If so, someone in Himmel's position in 1983 could reasonably have assumed that the knowledge obtained from a client secret, i.e., knowledge obtained from a
"privileged communication," would in turn be "privileged
knowledge."
The rationale expressed by ABA Formal Opinion 341 similarly supported Himmel's suggested construction of the Illinois Rule. The
Opinion stated:
An interpretation of [DR 7-102(B)] which would limit its scope to
the attorney-client privilege as it exists in each jurisdiction and the
Federal Rules of Evidence is undesirable because the lawyer's ethical duty would depend upon the rules of evidence in a particular
jurisdiction. There may be significant problems in knowing which
jurisdiction's evidentiary rule would be applied in a given case and
the scope of that privilege may vary widely among jurisdictions.
Furthermore[, it would raise] problems as to the difference between
waiver of privilege by60a client and a consent to the lawyer's disclosure of a confidence.
Thus, ABA Formal Opinion 341 makes it clear that it would be problematic to construe the word "unprivileged," as it appeared in the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility as being limited to
information protected by any attorney-client evidentiary rule. Nevertheless, the Illinois Supreme Court did not follow this interpretative
approach, even though, at the time of the events in Himmel, Illinois'
ethics rules tracked the language of the ABA Model Code.
58. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975). The ABA reiterated this position on several occasions. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1349 (1975); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op.
87-353 (1987).
59. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY R. 7-102(B) (1980) (emphasis added), available

at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mcpr.pdf.
60. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
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Finally, the Joint Committee and the Committee on Professional
Responsibility contend that, "amending well-known and commonlyused standard language will have consequences.... Even minor stylistic amendments will inevitably cause lawyers consulting the Illinois
Rules to speculate why the Illinois language was changed from the
originalABA text,"' 61 and might cause courts to misinterpret the Illinois Rules. However, one might ask whether it is better to adopt less
than optimal ABA Rules that very likely will be enforced or to adopt
optimal rules, taking deliberative steps (such as the use of careful
wording and the provision of clarifying commentary) so that they will
be enforced? Moreover, if the Illinois Rules were written in Illinois'
own voice and with Illinois' own words, one might also ask whether
courts would inevitably compare them to "the original ABA text."
C.

Unreported and Misrepresented Changes

A third problem with the overall process is that the Joint Committee and Committee on Professional Responsibility reports importantly
misrepresented the extent to, and ways in which, the new rules, with
their comments, constitute changes from the former Illinois ethics
rules. This is principally because of the ways in which the reports
characterize the significance of the ABA Comments. Paragraph 14 of
the Preamble to the new Illinois Rules downplays the role of the
Comments, asserting that they do not add obligations, but only provide guidance. 62 There are two somewhat inconsistent problems with
this approach.
On the one hand, the Corrected Final Report states that various
provisions of the former Illinois Rules are not included in the new
Rules, but are to be included in the new Comments. 63 But if the Comments no longer have the force of rules, and are only for guidance,
such changes would appear to be significant. Nevertheless, the immediately pertinent portions of the Corrected Final Report do not justify
any such substantive changes. Indeed, they do not even acknowledge
that the movement of these provisions from the Rules to the Comments will have any substantive impact.
61. ISBA-CBA JOINT COMM. ON ETHics 2000, CORRECrED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at
7 (emphasis added).
62. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (2010). Paragraph 14 states: "Comments and
the Preamble and Scope do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing
in compliance with the Rules." Id.
63. ISBA-CBA JoINT COMM. ON ETHics 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at

13-14 ("the substance of IRPC 1.56), concerning separation and retirement payments, should be
added to Comment [8]"); id. at 39 (switching the rule banning certain discrimination against
litigants and others, IRPC rule 8.4(a)(5), to a new Comment [3]).
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On the other hand, to the extent, if any, that the Comments actually
have the force of law, and are not mere guidance, two serious issues
arise. The first is that Paragraph 14 of the Illinois Preamble, which
says that the Comments do not add obligations, would simply be
wrong. The second is that the Corrected Final Report fails to acknowledge most of the Rules in the Comments. 64 Thus, the Corrected
Final Report would fail to adequately announce the substantive
changes reflected in the new Rules.
Indeed, it seems clear that, contrary to Paragraph 14 of the Preamble, the Comments, or at least some of them, go beyond the actual
text of the Rules and constitute actual "obligations" rather than just
advice. New Illinois Rule 1.80), for instance, states: "A lawyer shall
not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship
commenced." The former Illinois Rules did not contain an express
per se ban on such relations. The new Illinois Rules do not define the
term "client," but it is clear from some of the Rules themselves that
when a lawyer represents an organization, the organization, and not
its constituents, is the lawyer's client. 65 Consequently, on its face, new
Illinois Rule 1.80) would not forbid sexual relations between the organization's lawyer and the various individuals who serve as the organizational client's officers, agents or employees. Indeed, the
Corrected Final Report tried to make this point pellucid by proposing
that Comment 19 to new Illinois Rule 1.8 "should state that the rule
'66
does not apply to organizational clients."
The Committee on Professional Responsibility, however, objected,
and the Illinois Supreme Court adopted Comment 19 as it appears in
the ABA Model Rules, which states:
When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) of this Rule prohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or
outside counsel) from having a sexual relationship with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults
67
with that lawyer concerning the organization's legal matters.

64. Its discussion of the Comments is almost exclusively limited to situations in which: (1) the
Comments embody provisions that were previously in the former IRPC; and (2) the Committee
recommends that the Comments be revised.
65. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2010) ("A lawyer employed or re-

tained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents.").
66. ISBA-CBA JOINT COMM. ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at

17.
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 19 (2003).
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Thus, the adopted version of Comment 19 construes new Illinois Rule
1.80) beyond its literal words and states its construction as a rule, positing that "paragraph (j) of this Rule [1.8] prohibits.'' 68 This new per
se prohibition could especially affect corporate attorneys, including inhouse counsel, who regularly consult with multiple corporate agents.
It can hardly be assumed that, after adopting such a Comment, the
Illinois Supreme Court would conclude that there was no such prohibition. Thus, the Supreme Court's adoption of a voluminous body of
Comments is tantamount to adoption of countless new "rules" - or at
least many new rules and many less than obvious applications of old
rules.
D. Failure to Explain or Document Reasons
Fourth, not only did the process producing the new Illinois Rules
provide a dismal historical record of the ethical calculus underlying
each of the various Comments, it also failed, time and again, even to
state a reason for its recommendations regarding specific Rules. Thus,
with respect to a change in one Rule, the Corrected Final Report
states, "The Committee does not recommend retention of IRPC
1.5(e), which apparently creates an exception to the requirements of
Rule 1.5 that would otherwise be applicable for contingent fee agreements for collection of commercial accounts or insurance company
subrogation claims."' 69 The supposed inappropriateness of retaining
IRPC 1.5(e) is not addressed.
Similarly, in another place, when following the ABA's lead, the
Corrected Final Report states:
The model rule redefines the scope of protected information ("information relating to representation of a client," rather than "confidence or secret of the client"), and expands the areas of permissible
disclosure to include certain instances of client fraud and to permit
specifically disclosure to obtain legal advice
about compliance with
70
the rules. Those changes are appropriate.
Why are the changes "appropriate"? No explanation is given.
In short, the process giving rise to the new Illinois Rules was terribly time-consuming and not worth the wait. It involved an overwhelming deferral of ethical judgment to the ABA. It misrepresented
the nature and extent of the changes the new Rules introduced, especially in light of the role of the Comments. Finally, it failed to provide
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. ISBA-CBA JoiNr COMM. ON ETHics 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at
14.
70. Id.
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an adequate historical record of either the various ethical issues considered or of even the basic ethical rationales for the adoption of the
new Rules.
III.

A

DEEPLY FLAWED AND UNIMPRESSIVE PRODUCT

The new Rules themselves represent the twin sins of omission and
commission. Some Rules are problematic because they preserve former Rules that are insufficiently clear to convey meaningful guidance.
Others, on the other hand, although clear, adopt unjustifiably low ethical standards.
A.

Manifest Refusal to Clarify the Most Important Rules

A trigger for many of the most important legal ethics provisions is
'7 1
whether a lawyer either "knows" something or acts "knowingly."
The terminology section of the former IRPC provided no meaningful
guidance as to what constituted "knowledge." It merely declared:
"'Knowingly,' 'known' or 'knows' denotes actual knowledge of the
fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. '72 The new Rules leave this definition unchanged. 73 But
what does this "definition" mean? After all, it is elementary that one
should not define a word by using the word itself- or even another
form of the word - in the definition.7" The definition states that
whether a person, in fact, has knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. However, it does not explain whether the person's
knowledge itself may be based on circumstances. For example, for a
person to have "actual knowledge" about an event, must he have witnessed the event himself, or is hearsay evidence sufficient? Alternatively, does the word "actual" in "actual knowledge" mean that we
look to the person's subjective judgment as to whether he "knows"
something rather than to an objective, reasonable person test? 7 5 Or
perhaps use of the phrase "actual knowledge" is an imprecise effort to
71. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1(b); 1.2(d), (f)(1), (g), (h), (i); 1.8(a)(1);
1.10(a), (b); 1.11(a), (b), (c); 1.12(c); 1.13(b); 1.16(a)(1) (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).
72. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).
73. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2010). Rule 1.0(a) provides that "'[blelief' or
'believes' denotes that the person involved actually supposed the fact in question to be true. A
person's belief may be inferred from circumstances." Id. R. 1.0(a).
74. See, e.g., TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CoNTRACrS 84 (2007) ("Do not create a circular
definition; that is, do not define a term by using the same term.") (emphasis removed).
75. But see Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof'1 Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1996-145
(1996) (stating that whether an attorney has "actual knowledge" cannot only be imputed from
the circumstances but can be determined by an objective standard rather than the attorney's
subjective awareness).
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refer to the persuasiveness of the data that can give rise to "knowledge." If so, however, the definition fails to clarify just how persuasive the evidence must be.
76
Confusion regarding these and related questions is rampant. Most
courts and authorities agree that "mere suspicion" of some fact is not
"knowledge" thereof, 77 but that's where the agreement ends. 78 Some
use a "clear belief standard," that depends, in part, on the attorney's
subjective perspective. 79 Others require that there be a "firm factual
basis," standard,8 0 without, of course, identifying the quantity or quality of information that would make an otherwise wobbly factual basis
"firm," or a "substantial basis" test, which, in some cases, may be satisfied by little more than undocumented hearsay evidence. 81 Other
authorities apply more demanding language, stating that an attorney
only has "knowledge" that a client intends to commit perjury if the
client tells him so 8 2 or if the attorney possesses either "compelling
support" 83 for the belief or evidence establishing the belief "beyond a
84
reasonable doubt."
Evaluating these various approaches is further complicated by the
fact that many authorities indiscriminately cluster together cases and
opinions from a number of jurisdictions, without specifying which jurisdictions, such as Illinois, provide some definition of "knowledge"
and which, such as New York, following the original American Bar
Association's version of the Code of Professional Responsibility, do
not.
76. See, e.g., Erin K. Jaskot & Christopher J. Mulligan, Witness Testimony and the Knowledge
Requirement: An Atypical Approach to Defining Knowledge and Its Effect on the Lawyer as an
Officer of the Court, 17 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHiCS 845, 846 (2004) ("The lack of a coherent definition for what evidence constitutes 'knowledge' has resulted in a swirl of uncertainty surrounding
Model Rule 3.3.").
77. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 635 (1992) (citing numerous
authorities); Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2007-1 (2007).
78. For discussions of the diverse tests, see, for example, Brian Slipakoff & Roshini
Thayaparan, The Criminal Defense Attorney Facing Prospective Client Perjury, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 935 (2002); Jaskot & Mulligan, supra note 76.
79. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 635, at 5 (1992) ("Thus, DR
1-103(A) would not be triggered unless the lawyer has a clear belief, or possesses actual knowledge, as to the pertinent facts."); Nassau County (N.Y.) Bar Assoc., Op. 93-41 (Inquiry 502)
(addressing the obligation to report another attorney's wrongdoing under DR 1-103).
80. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 444 (8th Cir. 1988); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 05-04
(2005) ("firm knowledge" of an attorney's violation is required to trigger mandatory reporting).
81. State Bar of N.M. Advisory Opinions Comm., Formal Op. 1988-8 (1988).
82. State v. McDowell, 669 N.W.2d 204, 209 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
83. Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 309, 313 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
84. Shockley v. State, 565 A.2d 1373, 1379 (Del. 1989).
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Thus, before New York dramatically amended its Rules of Professional Responsibility, effective April 1, 2009, its DR 1-103 provided
that a "lawyer possessing knowledge.., of a violation of DR 1-102 [by
another lawyer] that raises a substantial question as to another lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness is other respects as a lawyer
shall report such knowledge. '85 Various New York ethics decisions
stated that this reporting requirement applied when a lawyer had either "actual knowledge" or a "clear belief" of such a violation of DR
1-102.86 At least one ethics opinion declared that this test "must be to
at least some degree subjective, dependent upon the attorney's assess'87
ment of the facts at the attorney's disposal.
Of course, it is possible that the Illinois definition, which refers to
"actual knowledge," was intended to rule out a "clear belief" standard
as insufficient to constitute "knowledge." But Illinois case law suggests that this is not so. In its 1989 decision, People v. Flores, the Illinois Supreme Court considered a convicted criminal defendant's
alleged denial of his constitutional right to counsel because his criminal defense attorney had refused, among other things, to call the client's family members as witnesses. 88 The attorney had refused
because he believed the family members would testify to a false alibi.
The convicted defendant contended that his counsel could only have
refused to call him to testify if the lawyer had "actual knowledge" that
his testimony would have been perjurious, and the attorney lacked
such "actual knowledge." The Illinois Supreme Court declared:
The defendant argues, however, that unless defense counsel had actual knowledge that the testimony was perjurious, his mere suspicion
is insufficient grounds to refuse to call an alibi witness. We disagree, as defense counsel should have discretion to make a good-faith
determination whether particular proposed witnesses for the defendant would testify untruthfully. Absent some showing that coun85. N.Y. LAWYER'S CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 1-103(A) (repealed April 1, 2009).

86. See N.Y. State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 635, at 5 (1992); Nassau County
(N.Y.) Bar Assoc., Op. 93-41 (1993). Incidentally, one could question these New York ethics
opinions. The phrase, "clear belief' was not used in DR 1-103, but in Ethical Consideration 1-4,
which stated that, "[a] lawyer should reveal voluntarily to [the proper officials] ... all knowledge
...of conduct of another lawyer which the lawyer believes clearly to be a violation of the
Disciplinary Rules that raises a substantial question .... " But the Preliminary Statement of
New York's version of the Code of Professional Responsibility made it clear that the Ethical
Considerations were "aspirational in character" rather than required. Consequently, one might
have distinguished between "knowledge," which would mandate reporting under DR 1-103(A),
and "a clear belief," which would not. These ethics opinions, however, did not make this distinction, and seemed to treat both "actual knowledge" and "a clear belief" as "knowledge."
87. See, e.g., Nassau County (N.Y.) Bar Assoc. Op. 93-41 (Inquiry 502) (1993) (addressing the
obligation to report another attorney's wrongdoing under DR 1-103).
88. People v. Flores, 538 N.E.2d 481, 496 (Ill. 1989).
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sel's decision was unreasonable under the circumstances, we cannot
say that the defendant was denied a fair trial as a consequence of
counsel's election not to call the members of his family to present
an alibi. For the same reason, defense counsel was not incompetent
in refusing
to permit the defendant to testify to the purported
89
alibi.
Although Flores technically involved the convicted defendant's constitutional rights and not the ethical status of the attorney's conduct,
the court's language clearly suggests that it believes the criminal defense attorney behaved properly by saying that he "should have discretion to make a good-faith determination whether particular
proposed witnesses for the defendant would testify untruthfully." 90 A
"good faith determination" rather than actual knowledge was sufficient to refuse to call the alibi witnesses.
Of course, Flores did not deal with a failure to call the client, only
the failure to call the client's family members as alibi witnesses. Several subsequent Illinois cases, however, have applied the Flores rationale to counsel's refusal to call and question counsel's own client, at
least to call and question the client in the normal, effective manner.
In People v. Bartee,91 the Second District cited Flores and applied it to
a criminal defendant's claim that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel when his counsel refused to question him, not his
92
family members, and only permitted him to testify in the narrative.
Specifically, the Second District rejected the defendant's argument
that he was entitled to a hearing at which his counsel was required to
establish a "firm factual basis" for the belief that the client would
commit perjury. 93 Similarly, in People v. Taggart, the Second District
denied a claim that a defendant was denied effective assistance of
counsel when he was forced to testify in the narrative. 94 The court
found that defense counsel had evinced a "good-faith determination"
that the defendant would have lied. 95 The court stated that "[i]n these
types of cases, it is important to identify on the record the basis for
counsel's belief [that his client will lie] so a proper determination of its
'96
reasonablenesscan be made.
89. Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. People v. Bartee, 566 N.E.2d 855 (I11.App. Ct. 1991).
92. Id. at 857.
93. Id.
94. People v. Taggart, 599 N.E.2d 501, 522 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
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In People v. Calhoun,9 7 the Fourth District cited Flores, Bartee, and
Taggart, and agreed with their analysis, stating that the test was
whether defense counsel, in forcing a client to testify in the narrative,
acted on "a good-faith determination that defendant was going to
commit perjury." 98 In Calhoun, however, the court ruled that defense
counsel's decision was "not reasonable." 99 Defense counsel simply
believed a different witness' testimony more than he believed his
client's.
The former IRPC, and its definition of "knowingly," "known" and
"knows," was adopted in February 8, 1990, effective August 1, 1990.
Former IRPC 1.2(a) provided that, "In a criminal case, the lawyer
shall abide by the client's decision . . . and whether the client will
testify."' 00 Former IRPC 3.3(a)(4) stated that, "[a] lawyer may not
Consequently, in a
offer evidence the lawyer knows to be false."''
the
right
to
testify
unless the lawyer
criminal case, the client had
"knew" that the testimony would be false, with knowledge now defined as "actual knowledge."
One could suggest that this change was intended to overrule the
Flores, Bartee, Taggart, and Calhoun reasoning that "defense counsel
should have discretion to make a good-faith determination whether
particular proposed witnesses for the defendant would testify untruthfully. ' 10 2 But there is no evidence to support such a suggestion.
After all of the years in which this definition has been in the Illinois
Rules, would it not have been useful for the Illinois Supreme Court to
have provided more guidance as to what "knows" and "knowingly"
mean? This is not to suggest that the Illinois Supreme Court should
have provided a philosophically or epistemologically "correct" definition for knowledge. Rather, the point is that the Supreme Court
should have taken this opportunity to more clearly communicate to
lawyers the circumstances in which the Supreme Court wants them to
act in the manner prescribed for those who act "knowingly." The Supreme Court could have provided at least a verbal standard - such as
a lawyer's "clear belief" or the lawyer's possession of "clear and convincing evidence" - and probably should have provided, in a comment
perhaps, illustrative examples of what would and would not constitute
97. People v. Calhoun, 815 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
98. Id. at 499-500.
99. Id. at 500.
100. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.2(a) (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).

101. Id. R. 3.3(a)(4).
102. Flores, 538 N.E.2d at 498 (emphasis added).
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knowledge. Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court preserved the old, un10 3
informative definition, including it in new Rule 1.0(f).
Ironically, although the new Illinois Rules did not alter the definition of "knowledge," they did offer a new rule for this one specific
situation: an attorney's calling as a witness a client he expects will testify falsely. The new Rules make only a relatively insignificant change
to former IRPC 1.2(a)'s injunction that an attorney must abide by a
criminal defendant's decision as to whether to testify. 1 4 Nevertheless,
there is an interesting change to former IRPC 3.3. New Rule 3.3(a)(3)
states:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.... A lawyer
may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in
a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is
05
false.'
On the one hand, because this new language does not alter the
"knows to be false" standard, it would not appear to effect a change in
the ethics rules. On the other hand, its clear message is that a lawyer
may not refuse to offer the testimony of a defendant in a criminal
matter merely because the lawyer has a "reasonable belief" that the
testimony will be false. If so, this may mark a major change from
Flores and its progeny. In a somewhat cryptic Comment, the Joint
Committee noted that new Rule 3.3(a) represented a substantive
change in the Rules, suggesting that in the past a lawyer could have
based a refusal to call his client upon a "reasonable belief. ' 10 6 In any
event, the Joint Committee did not explain whether the change was to
a standard of "firm factual foundation," "clear and convincing proof,"
or some other criterion.

103. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.0(f) (2010).
104. Compare ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (repealed Jan. 1, 2010), with ILL.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010).
105. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 3.3(a)(3) (2010).
106. ISBA-CBA JOINT COMm. ON ETHics 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at

26 ("One substantive change made by the model rule that [sic] should be noted, although it
seems appropriate in deference to the rights of criminal defendants. MR 3.3(a)(3) provides that

although a lawyer ordinarily may (but is not obliged to) refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer
believes is false, the lawyer may not refuse to offer testimony of a defendant in a criminal case
that the lawyer merely believes, rather than knows, is false."). This comment is cryptic, first,

because it fails to explain the apparently incorrect assertion that former IPRC utilized a "reasonable belief' standard. Second, it refuses to address the Flores line of cases. Third, in light of
Flores, it fails to explain why the supposed new rule "seems appropriate."
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Ignoring Important Modern Ethics Issues

By following the ABA Model Rules absent a "compelling reason"

not to do so, those involved in revising the Illinois ethics rules conveniently avoided addressing issues not clearly covered by the ABA

Model Rules. Thus, important ethics issues involving relatively innovative forms of practice were ignored, although they were the subject

of ethics opinions in other jurisdictions. For example, collaborative
lawyering, 10 7 which was the subject of many ethics opinions elsewhere,
not all of which were in agreement, 10 8 was not addressed in Illinois.
Similarly, serious ethical issues raised by the outsourcing of services

to domestic or foreign lawyers or non-lawyers are of increasing concern throughout the profession. 10 9 Relevant issues include, for instance, the need for disclosure to the client, the obtaining of the
client's informed consent, ensuring that those providing the services
are competent, exercising other supervisory responsibilities over the
attorneys and non-attorneys performing the outsourced services, and
billing practices. Numerous bar association ethics opinions have considered these issues and reached somewhat different results. 110 Moreover, although some characterize the relevant ABA opinion as

providing "rigorous, if not onerous, suggestions for lawyers to meet
the challenges of ensuring tasks are delegated to competent individu-

als and overseeing appropriately the execution of the projects,""'
others believe that the ABA opinion fails properly to appreciate the
107. In a typical collaborative law procedure, the attorneys for the parties sign an agreement
that, should the collaborative process not result in an agreement and the parties go to court, the
attorneys will not represent their respective clients in the ensuring litigation. See, e.g., Susan
Daicoff, CollaborativeLaw: A New Tool for the Lawyer's Toolkit, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
113, 120-21 (2009); Helen Gunnarson, CollaborativeDivorce, 93 ILL. B.J. 561 (2005).
108. A Colorado Bar Association ethics opinion concluded that the attorneys' agreement not
to represent their clients in any ensuing litigation violates Colorado Rule 1.7(b). See, e.g., Colo.
Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 115 (2007). The ABA and other state bar associations
have disagreed. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 07-447
(2007) (citing various state bar association opinions).
109. See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, The Ethics of Legal Outsourcing, 36 N. Ky. L. REV. 479
(2009); Mary C. Daly & Carole Silver, Ethical Issues in Outsourcing and Offshoring Legal Services and Negotiating Sourcing Deals, in PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY
PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, OUTSOURCING & OFFSHORING: PROTECTING CRITICAL

BUSINESS FUNCTIONS (2008), available at 946 PLI/PAT 133 (Westlaw).
110. See, e.g., Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2009-6 (2009) (requiring client's informed consent prior to outsourcing to lawyers or non-lawyers; can bill as part of
the legal fee or as an expense; citing various state and local bar association ethics opinions);
North Carolina State Bar, Formal Op. 12 (2008) (requiring client's written informed consent to
outsourcing); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Formal Op. 2006-3 (2006) (client's consent is
not always required when outsourcing non-legal services, listing,
however, a number of
exceptions).
111. Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 2009-6 (2009).
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nuances and challenges involved in outsourcing to foreign countries. 112 The new Illinois ethics rules do not address these issues at all.
Technological advances, as well as dramatically increased use of the

internet, have also raised important new issues, but the project to
overhaul Illinois' ethics rules, which ran from 1999 to July 2009, dealt
with few of them. For example, a number of bar associations weighed
in on the risk of transmitting metadata hidden in electronically transferred files and on the appropriateness of mining metadata from such

documents. 113 Illinois' new ethics rules provide no relevant guidance. 1 4 Furthermore, while ethics opinions from around the country
have addressed a variety of concerns regarding the internet in the past
ten years," n5 Illinois' new ethics rules contain only a few references to
112. See, e.g., Alexandra Hanson, Legal Process Outsourcing to India: So Hot Right Now, 62
SMU L. REV. 1889 (2009).
113. See, e.g., Vt. Bar Ass'n Prof'l Responsibility Section, Op. 2009-1 (2009); N.H. Bar Ass'n
Ethics Comm., Op. 2008-2009/4 (2009); Pa. Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2009-100 (2009); Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics, Op. 119 (2008); N.Y. County
Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. of Prof'l Ethics, Op. 738 (2008); Ariz. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 07-03 (2007);
Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Op. 2007-500 (2007); D.C. Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Op. 341 (2007); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006); Fla. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 06-2
(2006); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 782 (2004).
114. Nor are there any relevant Illinois State Bar Association ethics opinions.
115. Several of these opinions consider web management of client files. See, e.g., N.C. State
Bar, Formal Op. 5 (2008) (web management of client files); N.J. Adv. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics,
Formal Op. 701 (2006). Many address specific advertising concerns, the answers to which are
usually not obvious from the ABA Rules. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Prof'l
Ethics, Op. 799 (2006) (lawyer may not participate in a website that gathers information about
persons with legal problems, analyzes the data to determine which lawyers of among those registered with it might be suitable, and then provides this information to such lawyers in exchange
for their payment of a fee); Tex. Prof'l Ethics Comm., Op. 573 (2006) (lawyer permitted to
participate on website that connects attorneys to prospective clients if certain procedure are met,
including that the website does not base the connection upon its subjective analysis of the client's
legal needs but, instead, uses an automated process to match attorneys with prospective clients);
Va. Ethics Adv. Comm., Op. A-0117 (2006) (lawyer may be included in an on-line legal directory
provided that it is a directory and not a referral agency); N.J. Comm. on Att'y Adver., Op. 36
(2005) (lawyer who wants to pay to be listed on internet site must "ensure that the listing or
advertisement contains a prominently and unmistakably displayed disclaimer, in a presentation
at least equal to the largest and most prominent font and type on the site, declaring that 'all
attorney listings are a paid attorney advertisement, and do not in any way constitute a referral or
endorsement by an approved or authorized lawyer referral service."'); N.C. State Bar, Formal
Op. 1 (2004) (participation in on-line "matching service"); N.J. Comm. on Att'y. Adver., Op. 32
(2005) (selection and advertising of internet domain names); N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l
& Judicial Ethics, Op. 2003-01 (2004) (selection and advertising of internet domain names).
Other ethics opinions respond to diverse inquiries. See, e.g., N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 10
(2006) (permissibility of a "virtual" law practice); N.Y. State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Prof'! Ethics,
Op. 820 (2008) (propriety of using an e-mail provider that scans e-mails for advertising purposes); Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility & Conduct, Op. 2005-168 (2005)
(whether duty of confidentiality is owed to someone who accepts attorney's internet invitation to
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the internet, or even to electronic communications,' 16 and do not provide adequate guidance regarding the many individual issues that continue to arise.
C.

Unjustifiably Low Ethical Standards

Another complication is that in the past many Rules applied either
when a lawyer knew or "reasonably should" have known, 117 the latter
now appears in far fewer Rules. 118 As a result, it becomes increasingly
important to fathom what constitutes knowledge. Elimination of the
"reasonably should know" language leads us to another concern regarding the substance of the new Rules. In a number of important
contexts, the new Rules either reduce the standards of conduct to
which lawyers were previously held or, even when they increase those
standards, they fail to do so adequately. 119 Thus, although a number
of obligations used to be triggered as long as a lawyer reasonably
should have known about certain facts, they are no longer triggered
unless the lawyer actually knows (whatever "knows" means) the facts.
Another example is Illinois' response to the new ABA Rules requiring that in certain scenarios clients receive informed consent and
requiring that, at a minimum, this informed consent be confirmed in
writing. New Illinois Rule 1.0(e) adopts the ABA's definition of "informed consent" as "the agreement by a person to a proposed course
of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information
and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available
alternatives to the proposed course of conduct" and uses this term in

submit legal questions electronically); Or. State Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. 2005164 (2005) (propriety of communicating with represented persons through their websites).
116. See ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.0(n) (includes "electronic record" in the defini-

tion of "writing" or "written"); R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (including electronic communication in the notion
of a "document" that may have been inadvertently received); R. 7.2 (as to advertising); R. 7.3 (as
to direct contact with prospective clients). The most recent Illinois State Bar Association ethics
opinion dealing with internet use was issued in 1996. See Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 96-10 (1996).
Although that opinion provided a fairly thorough consideration of the issues it addressed, the
opinion responded to few, if any, of the issues which have preoccupied ethics opinions in other
jurisdictions over the past 10 years.
117. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1(b); 1.2(f)(1); 1.8(a)(1); 1.10(a), (b);

1.11(a); 1.12(c); 1.16(a)(1), (2); 3.3(a)(1), (a)(5); 3.6(a), (b)(5); 3.7(a), (b); 3.8(b); 4.1(a); 4.3;
7.3(b)(1); 8.4(b)(1) (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).
118. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1(f); 2.3(b); 3.6(a); 3.6 cmt. 5(5); 4.3;

8.4(k) cmt. 10, 13 (2010).
119. Of course, there are also some instances in which the new Illinois Rules do elevate the
standards.
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many different provisions.12 0 Nevertheless, although the ABA Model
Rules invariably require that "informed consent" be "confirmed in
writing," Illinois' new ethics rules generally do not. 12 1 This is very
troubling, because it is the written confirmation requirement that
helps to ensure that consent is given and that helps to prove whether it
was given. (Indeed, one might even suspect that a lawyer's malpractice carrier might soon independently require such written confirmation.) The failure to follow the ABA Model Rules in this respect is
especially surprising given the Joint Committee's policy of following

the ABA Model Rules absent "a compelling reason not to do

so. '' 122

Strangely, the Joint Committee's justification for its disposing of the
confirmation in writing requirement cites no previous Illinois Supreme Court precedent and seems concerned principally with protecting attorneys from relatively unlikely complications.
In fact, let us examine each part of the explanation provided in the
Corrected Final Report with respect to new Rule 1.7, which the Corrected Final Report cross-referenced when it rejected various other
"confirmed in writing" requirements. The explanation begins as follows: "The [ABA] model rule requires waivers of conflicts (i.e., client
consents) to be in writing. That would be a significant change from
the current Illinois rule. ' 123 In fact, however, ABA Rule 1.7(b)(4)
does not require that a client's informed consent be in writing. It only
requires that such consent "be confirmed in writing. ' 124 New Illinois
Rule 1.0(b) explains that, "'[c]onfirmed in writing,' when used in reference to the informed consent of a person, denotes informed consent
that is given in writing by the person or a writing that a lawyer
promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral informed
25
consent."1
The Corrected Final Report goes on to say: "Although written conflict waivers are clearly desirable in many situations, requiring written
120. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PRO'L CONDUCr R. 1.0(e); 1.2(c); 1.2(e); 1.4(a)(1); 1.6(a);
1.7(b)(4); 1.8(a)(3), (b); 1.8(f)(1), (g); 1.9(a), (b)(2); 1.11(a)(2), (d)(2)(i); 1.12(a); 1.18(d)(1);
2.3(b) (2010).
121. Instances in which Illinois omits any requirement for informed consent to be "confirmed
in writing" include Rules 1.7(b)(4); 1.9(a), (b)(2); 1.11(a)(2), (d)(2)(i); 1.12(a); 1.18(d)(1). ILL.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr (2010). Illinois only expressly includes the "confirmed in writing"
requirement in Rule 1.5. Id. R. 1.5.
122. ISBA-CBA JOINT COMM. ON ETHics 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at

5 (citing major policy considerations, typically positions previously expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court, as compelling reasons).
123. ISBA-CBA JOINT COMM. ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at

16.
124.
125.

1.7(b)(4) (2003).
1.0(b) (2010) (emphasis added).

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
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consent in every situation as a matter of discipline is both unnecessary
and inappropriate. Often, the conflict issues are clear, the affected
1 26
clients understand the issues, and the matter is uncomplicated.'
Yet even where the issues are arguably clear, the matter is uncomplicated, and affected clients supposedly understand all of this, informed
consents are unquestionably required under the new Illinois Rules.
Merely confirming them in writing would not seem to be unduly
onerous.
The Corrected Final Report continues: "The need for a consent may
arise unexpectedly and without notice in the midst of a transaction or
other matter. In such cases, requiring a writing merely adds unnecessary delay and expense, and elevates technicality over the substantive
question whether consent was given.' 1 27 Note, first, even according to
the new Illinois Rules, the fact that "[t]he need for a consent may
arise unexpectedly and without notice in the midst of a transaction or
other matter," in absolutely no way dispenses with the requirement of
informed consent, no matter how much "delay and expense" ob128
taining informed consent entails.
Second, the assertion that requiring a writing "merely adds unnecessary delay and expenses" is incorrect. Requiring a writing encourages
attorneys to seek consent and helps both attorneys and clients to
prove whether consent was actually provided.
Third, the reference to "unnecessary delay and expense" appears to
be out of touch with the "confirmed in writing" requirement itself. A
writing is defined by new Illinois Rule 1.0(n) as "a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photography, audio or
video recording and e-mail."'129 Consequently, a lawyer could use email, a cell phone, or a fax machine to transmit such a confirmation
without either significant delay or cost. Furthermore, "[i]f it is not
feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives
informed consent," new Illinois Rule 1.0(b) states, "then the lawyer
1 30
must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.'

126. ISBA-CBA JoIr COMM. ON ETHics 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at
16.
127. ISBA-CBA JoIr Comm.ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at
16.
128. Of course, one wonders why obtaining such consent should often involve significant
expense.

129. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L
130. Id. R. 1.O(b).

CONDUCT

R. 1.0(n) (2010).
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After discounting the material benefits of a writing requirement and
exaggerating its inconvenience, the Corrected Final Report cites three
fears:
Moreover, subjecting a lawyer to potential discipline, disqualification, and malpractice liability for want of a writing-when it may be
entirely clear that the consent was in fact given-is not reasonable.
Accordingly, the Committee recommends that the rule and comments be revised
to eliminate the requirement that conflict waivers
13
be in writing. '
Yet, because confirming consent in writing is not difficult, time-consuming or expensive, it is difficult to understand how a lawyer who
fails to provide it could justifiably object to the possibility of discipline. Whether discipline would be imposed and the nature of any
such discipline would, of course, depend on the attendant circumstances. Where it is "entirely clear that the [informed] consent was in
fact given," the likelihood of serious discipline seems remote. After
all, if informed consent was in fact given, the lack of written confirmation would seem to be harmless error, and courts are reluctant to disqualify counsel, and disrupt their own calendars, in cases of harmless
error. Similarly, in instances of harmless error, the very lack of damages would make civil malpractice liability quite unlikely. As already
mentioned, one of the best ways for an attorney to protect herself
against a claim of not having given informed consent would be to routinely confirm in writing that such consent was given.
Even if one could argue that there was a "compelling reason" not to
follow the ABA's "confirmed in writing" requirement, it is unclear
why the new Illinois Rules do not at least indicate that such client
consent should "preferably be confirmed in writing." New Illinois
Rule 1.5(b), for instance, states: "The scope of the representation and
the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be
responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing
.... ,,132 One of the Comments to the new Illinois Rules refer to a
133
preference that certain communications be in writing.
From a technical perspective, it is interesting to note that new Illinois Rule 1.0(b) only defines the term "confirmed in writing" with
respect to "informed consent":
"Confirmed in writing," when used in reference to the informed
consent of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person or a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to
131. ISBA-CBA JOINT COMM. ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at

16.
132. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2010) (emphasis added).
133. See ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 cmt. 6 (2010).
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the person confirming an oral informed consent. See paragraph (e)
for the definition of "informed consent." If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives informed
must obtain or transmit it within a reasonaconsent, then the lawyer
134
ble time thereafter.

However, the only new Illinois Rule, other than Rule 1.0(b), to use
the phrase, "confirmed in writing," is new Illinois Rule 1.5. Yet, although Rule 1.5 twice requires that a client's agreement must be "con1 35
firmed in writing," it never refers to a client's "informed consent."'
Thus, there is no provision in Illinois' new rules that expressly uses the
term "confirmed in writing" in reference to "the informed consent of
a person," 136 which is the only context in which "confirmed in writing"
is defined!
Several important changes in the law reduce a lawyer's duty to
"protect" a client's confidential information. 37 Former IPRC 1.6 contained a general rule forbidding an Illinois lawyer from either revealing or using certain client information. 138 By contrast, new Illinois
Rule 1.6 only proscribes the revealing of client information, leaving
for new Illinois Rule 1.8(b) to provide the narrower rule that, "[a]
lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client
to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed con1 39
sent, except as permitted or required by these Rules."'
New Illinois Rule 1.6 also expands a lawyer's obligation to reveal
certain information. The old Rule only required a lawyer to disclose
"information about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that would result in death or
serious bodily harm.' 140 Thus, under the old Rule, if the information
134. Id. R. 1.0(b).
135. Id. R. 1.5.
136. The ABA Model Rules, by contrast, expressly uses "confirmed in writing" in connection
with a client's "informed consent" on a number of occasions. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(4); 1.9(a), (b)(2); 1.11(a)(2) (2003).
137. The Corrected Final Report argues that new Illinois Rule 1.6 actually expands the protection of client information by applying to "information relating to the representation of a client" rather than to client "confidences" and "secrets," the terms used in former IRPC 1.6. See
ISBA-CBA JOINr COMM. ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 14.

Nonetheless, the force of this argument seems blunted by the broad definition the term secret as,
"information gained in the professional relationship, that the client has requested be held inviolate or the revelation of which would be embarrassing to or would likely be detrimental to the
client."
138. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010) stated, "Except when

required under Rule 1.6(b) or permitted under Rule 1.6(c), a lawyer shall not, during or after
termination of the professional relationship with the client, use or reveal a confidence or secret
of the client known to the lawyer unless the client consents after disclosure."
139. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2010) (emphasis added).
140. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010) (emphasis added).
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was a client confidence or secret, but was not "about the client" or
was not about the client's future commission of an act, this exception
would not have applied. 141 New Rule 1.6 broadens the obligation to
require disclosure of "information," whether or not "about the client."
In addition, it requires disclosure "to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm," omitting the language limiting the duty of
disclosure to cases in which such consequences would result "from the
client's future commission of an act.' 42 Of course, additional obligations to disclose do not lessen the standards that apply to the attorney,
because they represent extra duties.
But new Illinois Rule 1.6 also provides lawyers with greater discretion to disclose confidential information. Although old Rule 1.6 permitted a lawyer to disclose a client's intention to commit any crime,
new Rule 1.6 not only permits disclosure of information to prevent a
client from committing a crime, 143 but also permits disclosure, "to pre-

vent the client from committing fraud that is reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the
lawyer's services."'1 44 Furthermore, new Rule 1.6 breaks new ground
by allowing a lawyer to disclose information "to prevent, mitigate or
rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client
45
has used the lawyer's services.'
New Rule 1.6 also expands a lawyer's right to disclose information
to promote the lawyer's self-interest.146 Former Rule 1.6 authorized a
141. ISBA-CBA JOINT COMM. ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at
15.
142. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2010). The ISBA-CBA Joint Comm. on Ethics 2000, Corrected Final Report explains this change: "The Committee believes it would be
incongruous in this context to require disclosure with respect to a client (the current Illinois rule)
while merely permitting disclosure to prevent a similar harmful act by a non-client (the ABA
rule). To correct this incongruity, the Committee recommends that new Rule 1.6(c) apply to the
acts of non-clients as well as clients." ISBA-CBA JoINr COMM. ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECTED
FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 15.
143. ILL. RULES OF PRO'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2010).
144. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2) (2010). At first blush, however, it is unclear whether, as a practical matter, Rule 1.6(b)(2) provides a lawyer with any additional discretion. It seems likely that virtually
any fraud covered by Rule 1.6(b)(2) would also constitute a crime, the prevention of which is
authorized under Rule 1.6(b)(1). See, e.g., 720 IIl. Comp. Stat. 5/16H-1 (the "Illinois Financial
Crime Law") and 720 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/17-1 to 5/17-29 (various deceptive practices offenses).
145. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (2010).
146. Interestingly, unlike sub-sections (b) and (c), which provide for limitations on a lawyer's
duty of confidentiality, Rule 1.6(d) expands the duty of confidentiality by defining information
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lawyer to disclose certain information when "necessary to establish or
collect the lawyer's fee or to defend the lawyer or the lawyer's em'14 7
ployees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
New Rule 1.6 allows such disclosures "to establish a claim or defense
on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client," even if the controversy does not involve a fee dispute. It also
permits a lawyer to disclose this information in order "to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based
upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
48
client."1
Surely one could suggest moral justifications for these changes. Unhappily, although the Corrected Final Report offers considerable discussion regarding new Rule 1.6, it makes no reasoned case for the new
provisions expanding a lawyer's discretion for disclosing information.
The Supreme Court Committee on Professional Responsibility recommended adoption of these provisions without any comment. 149 Perhaps the Joint Committee and the Supreme Court Committee on
Professional Responsibility simply saw no "compelling reason" to provide less discretion than afforded by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. But the failure to address the pros and cons of this
change is troubling. On numerous occasions, the need to satisfy or
respond to a client's expectations is flagged as an important concern. 150 Yet the various Reports do not even discuss the likelihood,
let along the possible significance, that a client would have strong expectations of confidentiality regarding their past actions.
Another example of a loosened standard arises in connection with
fee-sharing agreements between attorneys not in the same firm. Former IPRC 1.5(f) and (g) have been replaced by new Illinois Rule
1.5(e). Former IPRC 1.5(f) allowed a division of fees that was not
proportional to the services performed by each lawyer, but it only did
received by a lawyer "participating in an approved lawyers' assistance program or an approved
circuit court intermediary program" is "protected as confidential client information for purposes
of the Rules." Id. R. 1.6(d). Interestingly, Comment 19 explains that this could include, for
instance, "[i]nformation about the fitness or conduct of a law student, lawyer or judge." Id. R.
1.6 cmt. 19.
147. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).

148. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2010).
149. The Supreme Court Committee on Professional Responsibility Report differed from the
ISBA-CBA Joint Committee on Ethics 2000, Corrected Final Report by recommending that
certain additional information be treated as confidential, and the Supreme Court adopted that
recommendation. See Redmond, supra note 5, at Exhibit B.
150. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(5); 1.2 cmt. 13; 1.7 cmts. 21, 24; 1.8

cmt. 3 (2010).
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so if the client consented thereto in a writing, containing specified dis-

closures, that was signed by the client. 151 New Rule 1.5(e) permits an
agreement providing a non-proportional allocation, with essentially
the same provisos as former Rule 1.5(e), so long as it is confirmed in
writing. 152 However, under new Rule 1.5(e) there is no requirement
that this writing be signed by the client. Neither the Corrected Final

Report nor the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Responsibility Report explains why it was appropriate to dispense with the requirement that the writing be signed by the client.
One last example involves a lawyer's right to terminate representa-

tion of a party. Former IPRC 1.16(b) stated that unless a lawyer was
obligated to terminate the representation under IPRC 1.16(a), the
lawyer could not withdraw from representing a party, and in a matter
before a tribunal could not ask the tribunal for permission to withdraw, unless one of various conditions was satisfied. 153 A lawyer was

not permitted to withdraw simply because her withdrawal would not
have a materially adverse impact on the client's interests. By contrast,
new Illinois Rule 1.16(b)(1) allows such a withdrawal if it "can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the cli151. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(0 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).
152. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (2010). Rule 1.5(e)'s requirement that each of

the attorneys assume "financial responsibility" for the matter rather than old Rule 1.5(f)'s reference to simple "responsibility" is consistent with the way in which old Rule 1.5(f) had been
judicially construed. See ISBA-CBA JoItrN

COMM. ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECTED FINAL RE-

PORT, supra note 17, at 62 (citing In re Storment, 786 N.E.2d 963, 971 (2002)).
153. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010). Specifically, it prohib-

ited such withdrawal unless:
(1) the client:
(A) insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted under existing
law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
(B) seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct;
(C) insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited by these Rules;
(D) by other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out
the employment effectively;
(E) insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer engage in
conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer although not
prohibited by these Rules; or
(F) substantially fails to fulfill an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses or fees;
(2) the lawyer's inability to work with co-counsel indicates that the best interests of the
client likely will be served by withdrawal;
(3) the client consents to termination of the lawyer's employment after disclosure; or
(4) the lawyer reasonably believes that a tribunal will, in a proceeding pending before
the tribunal, find the existence of other good cause for withdrawal.
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ent.' 1 54 Neither the Rule nor the Comments provide any guidance as
to what constitutes a "material adverse effect." In many cases, however, when one lawyer withdraws, her replacement will have to repeat
some of the work that was already done - or will have to spend additional time becoming familiar with the results of the work that was
already done. Consequently, if the first attorney received payment for
such work, her withdrawal would certainly seem to impose duplicative
costs on the client. It would be useful if the Illinois Supreme Court
would have made its intentions in such a case clearer.
IV.

THE BROADER FAILURE OF THE PROCESS TO AMEND THE

ETHICS

RULES

Many actors play formal or informal roles in the regulation of legal
ethics in Illinois. These include, among others, the Illinois Supreme
Court and other Illinois courts, the Committee on Professional Responsibility, the ARDC, the ISBA, and the CBA. This article does
not aspire to be a comprehensive evaluation of the manifold and interrelated functions of these institutional agents. Nevertheless, this article recommends a number of relatively simple, but significant,
initiatives for improving Illinois' legal ethics regulatory scheme. Most
of these measures are not novel. But their serious consideration by
Illinois officials, and, indeed, their adoption, are long overdue.
First, under the status quo, there is no mechanism for obtaining a
timely authoritative opinion as to the proper response to a particular
ethical problem. Although the ISBA and, to a lesser degree, the
CBA, sometimes issues opinions, they are not authoritative 155 and fol156
lowing non-authoritative opinions, in some jurisdictions at least,
have led to attorneys being disciplined. 157 Technological and practice
changes seem to have ushered in an ever-growing number of serious
ethics questions, and the need for a timely mechanism for obtaining
authoritative responses is increasingly acute. Reliance on the ABA
154. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(1) (2010).
155. Illinois State Bar Association opinions include the following disclaimer:
ISBA Advisory Opinions on Professional Conduct are prepared as an educational service to members of the ISBA. While the Opinions express the ISBA interpretation of
the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and other relevant materials in response to a
specific hypothesized fact situation, they do not have the weight of law and should not
be relied upon as a substitute for individual legal advice.
See, e.g., Ill. Bar Ass'n Adv. Op. on Prof'I Conduct, Op. 05-01 (Jan. 2006).
156. Some jurisdictions, however, expressly protect attorneys who in good faith rely on certain
non-authoritative ethics opinions issued within the jurisdiction.
157. See Lawrence K. Hellman, A Better Way to Make State Legal Ethics Opinions,22 OKLA.
CrrY U. L. REV. 973 (1997) (arguing that non-authoritative opinions fail to protect attorneys
who rely upon them and citing illustrative examples).
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Model Rules is unavailing, because jurisdictions with similarly worded

ethics codes often reach differing conclusions. Indeed, the ABA itself
158
sometimes reverses its own opinions.
Although the ARDC Ethics Inquiry Panel is a response to attor-

neys' recognized need for answers to ethics questions, this initiative,
too, offers no authoritative help - and no safe harbor for attorneys
159
who seek such answers. In a number of states, such as Georgia,
162
New Jersey,
Hawaii, 160 Kentucky, 161 Missouri,

63

Rhode Island, 164

and Texas, 165 either the State Supreme Court or a unit thereof ap-

proves the issuance of authoritative opinions. Although these agencies may not issue many opinions per year, the opinions that are
issued provide authoritative guidance to numerous attorneys. A number of commentators have suggested that the highest courts of other

jurisdictions become similarly involved in the issuance of authoritative
advisory opinions. 166 It is time for the Illinois Supreme Court to seriously consider creating a mechanism for the issuance of authoritative
167

opinions.
A system for issuing authoritative ethics opinions could be proactive. Such a system could facilitate a timely and effective response to

contemporary developments. The plethora of ethics opinions issued
by various bodies in the years since the ABA's adoption of the recom158. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001) (rejecting the position the ABA had previously taken in Formal Op. 337 (1974), and reiterated in
Informal Op. 1407 (1978), with respect to the nonconsensual recording of conversations).
159. See Interpreting the Standards of Conduct, Ethical Considerations (ECs) and/or Directory Rules (DRs), STATE BAR OF GA., http://gabar.org/handbook/supreme-court-of-georgia/
(last visited Nov. 25, 2010).
160. The opinions are issued by the Disciplinary Board of the Hawaii Supreme Court. See
DISCIPLINARY BD. OF THE HAw. Sup. CT., http://odchawaii.com/FORMALWRITTEN_
OPINIONS.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2010).
161. See Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.530.
162. See Mo. Sup. CT. R. 5.30.
163. See N.J. Sup. CT. R. 1:19-1.
164. These are issued by issued by an Ethics Advisory Panel established by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court in 1986 to give private advice to attorneys. Interestingly, attorneys are not obligated to abide by the opinions rendered by the Ethics Advisory Panel, but if the attorney does
rely on the opinion he or she "is fully protected from any subsequent charge of impropriety."
See Ethics Advisory Panel, JUDICIARY OF R.I., http://www.courts.state.ri.us/supreme/ethics/
defaultethics.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2010).
165. Opinions of the Texas Supreme Court Ethics Commission are available at TEX. ETHICS
COMM'N, http://www.ethics.state.tx.us/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2010).
166. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 149, at 1000-008 (specifically recommending the New
Jersey model). See generally Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More
Effective Regulation of Lawyers' Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 320 (2002) (recommending state supreme court review of ethics opinions).
167. Of course, such a system could be structured in various ways. It could, for instance, begin
with an ethics committee composed not only of lawyers but also of non-lawyers.
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mendations of its Ethics 2000 Commission and the failure of these
opinions to consistently agree with one another make it clear that numerous important questions cannot be unambiguously resolved from
the language of the Rules and Comments alone.
Of course, any such system could include a variety of valuable features. Consider, for instance, the New Jersey model. The New Jersey
Supreme Court appoints eighteen members, fifteen lawyers and three
non-lawyers, to its Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (the
"Advisory Committee"). 168 Any member of the New Jersey bar, any
local, county or state bar association in New Jersey, and the New
Jersey Supreme Court itself may submit inquiries to the Advisory
Committee. 169 Although the Advisory Committee may generally refuse to issue an opinion in response to an inquiry, it may not refuse to
issue an opinion in response to an inquiry by the New Jersey Supreme
Court. 70 Interestingly, and importantly, there is a review process
whereby "any aggrieved member of the [New Jersey] bar, bar association or ethics committee"'17 may challenge an ethics opinion issued by
the Advisory Committee by filing a timely petition for review.17 2 This
review process is designed as an adversarial procedure that helps to
assure a thorough and comprehensive consideration of the relevant
ethical considerations. 17 3 Several other states have differing processes
174
involving state supreme court review of ethics opinions.
By establishing a system in which it is involved in the issuance of
authoritative ethics opinions, the Illinois Supreme Court can assume
the mantle of leadership in helping to shape the development of ethi175
cal norms.
Second, if, in fact, the Illinois Supreme Court is serious about deferring to the ABA Rules and Comments and concerns regarding uniformity, then it should consider announcing an "amnesty rule" for
anyone who reasonably and in good faith relies on an ABA Opinion
interpreting language that has been incorporated into the Illinois
Rules. Of course, the Illinois Supreme Court could always prospec168. N.J. RULES OF COURT R. 1:19, available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/rl-19.
htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2010).
169. Id. R. 1:19-2 (as to members of the bar and bar associations); R. 1:19-5 (as to the New
Jersey Supreme Court).
170. Id. R. 1:19-5.
171. Id. R. 1:19-8(a).
172. Id.
173. See Hellman, supra note 157, at 1001-005 (discussing the New Jersey procedure in some
detail).
174. See Joy, supra note 166, at n.109 (describing the processes of other states).
175. Id. at 381 (arguing that making ethics opinions authoritative "enhances the value and
function of ethics opinions in shaping ethical norms").
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tively interpret the language of its Rule differently, which would make
continued reliance on a contrary ABA Opinion unreasonable.
Third, the Illinois Supreme Court needs to pay attention to the legal
ethics problems that confront Illinois law students who work as summer law clerks during and between academic years. There is currently
no effective system in place for advising such students with respect to
ethical problems that arise in the workplace. Do the legal ethics rules
apply to law students when they work for an attorney? In some circumstances, the answer is "yes," while in others, depending on what
function the law student serves, the answer is unclear. 176 But even if
the answer right now happens to be "no," it would be appropriate for
the Illinois Supreme Court to determine whether this ought to be
changed. When a law student works for a lawyer, even if she only
performs research rather than appears in court, it might be appropriate for her to work within the parameters of some, if not all, of the
legal ethics rules.
Moreover, if, while working in a firm, a student witnesses a lawyer
violate new Illinois Rule 8.4(a) or Rule 8.4(b), should the student
have a duty to report under new Illinois Rule 8.3? Interestingly, although attorneys on the ARDC Ethics Inquiry Panel, though not providing "legal advice," will at least talk to Illinois attorneys about ethics
issues, they are not authorized to speak with law students about ethics
issues that the students encounter. The Illinois Supreme Court needs
to take the lead, rather than merely follow the ABA, in establishing
ethics rules relating to Illinois law students. In addition, the Illinois
Supreme Court should establish an institutional mechanism for advising law students regarding any such obligations.
V.

OTHER HIGHLIGHTS OF THE

2010

CHANGES

Before discussing a few additional substantive changes to the legal
ethics rules, a few comments are in order regarding materials that
176. See In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 1998):
Rule 711 carves out a set of legal services that third-year law students are permitted to
perform, under the specified circumstances. In our view, this is just another way of
saying that a third-year law student may act as a lawyer within the limitations imposed
by the rule. As such, she bears the same ethical responsibilities to her client and to the
court that a full-fledged member of the bar would have, just as an associate in a law
firm does despite working under the supervision of a partner.
Id. Nevertheless, this decision does not seem to address a myriad of other ethical dilemmas a
student law clerk could confront. For example, a lawyer who is an associate in a firm may need
to report another lawyer in the firm who suffers from disability or impairment. See ABA Comm.
on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 03-431 (2003). What is a student law clerk's responsibility if she observes such a disability or impairment in an attorney at the firm? Would it
matter whether the student law clerk did work for that particular attorney?
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have been made available by the Illinois ARDC and the Illinois Supreme Court. These materials must be used with care. For example,
the ARDC website provides what purports to be a red-lined docu77
ment comparing the new Illinois Rules to the old Illinois Rules.

Nevertheless, the red-lined document completely omits the texts of
new Rules 1.0, 1.18, 2.4, 3.9, and 6.5.178 In addition, although one of
the major changes to the Rules was the adoption of Comments to the
Rules that provide a guide to how the rules are to be interpreted and
applied, the ARDC's red-lined document does not include the Illinois

Comments.
The ARDC and the Illinois Supreme Court web sites, however, do
provide the complete text of the new Rules and their Comments online. 179 Each Illinois attorney must examine and carefully consider
these documents. 180 Many of these provisions are of especial interest

to business and commercial lawyers. Although this article covers a
number of important changes, reading it is not an adequate alternative
for studying the new Rules themselves.
First, we will consider new Rules that have no direct predecessors.

Then we will consider some of the important changes within each of
the eight divisions of Rules. 18 1 This Part V will not discuss Rules already addressed in Parts II through IV.
A.

New Rules without Direct Predecessors

It is not always clear whether a particular provision constitutes a
new rule without a direct predecessor and when it is simply a change

or addition to an existing rule. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that
there are at least four independently numbered Rules that are "new
177. Redline Comparisonof the 1990 Illinois Rules of ProfessionalConduct to the 2010 Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct, ILL. Arr'Y REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMM'N,

www.iardc.org/Redline%20Version%20of%201990%2ORules.html
178. Id.
179. See ILL.

COURTS,

https://

(last visited Nov. 25, 2010).

http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Rules/ArtVIII/default_

NEW.asp (last visited Nov. 25, 2010); ILL. ATIrY REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMM'N,

https://www.iardc.org/newrules2l0.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2010). As has already been suggested, by copying and pasting the rules and comments into one's word processor, one can easily
create a searchable text for oneself. John Levin, Illinois Adopts New Rules of ProfessionalConduct, CHI. BAR ASS'N REC., Sept. 2009, at 52, 52.

180. Reading the ISBA-CBA Joint Commmittee on Ethics 2000, Corrected Final Report or
the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Professional Responsibility Report, while certainly
useful, may at times be materially misleading. The rules actually adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court sometimes differ significantly from those set forth in those documents.
181. The Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (2010), just as the old rules, are divided into
eight divisions, each with its own number of rules.
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rules": Rule 1.18, 2.4, 3.9 and 6.5.182 Although there was no prior
Rule 1.0, new Rule 1.0, which defines a number of terms, was preceded under the old Rules by an unnumbered section on terminology
and will not receive separate attention in this article.
1. Rule 1.18 - Duties to Prospective Client
Attorneys sometimes have preliminary interactions with prospective clients. A "prospective client" is "[a] person who discusses with a
lawyer the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter."'1 83 These interactions raise questions regarding
confidentiality and conflicts of interest. The former Rules did not expressly address these concerns. Under new Rule 1.18, a lawyer may
not use or reveal information acquired during a consultation with a
prospective client except in circumstances in which the lawyer could
reveal information of a former client under Rule 1.9.184 In addition, a
lawyer who consulted with a prospective client may not represent a
client with interests "materially adverse" to those of the prospective
client "in the same or a substantially similar matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter."'1 85 Nevertheless, a
lawyer is not disqualified if both the prospective client and the affected client give their informed consent. 186 There is no requirement
that this consent be confirmed in writing. Even if a particular lawyer
is disqualified, new Rule 1.18 provides that the lawyer's firm is not
disqualified if "the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information
than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the
prospective client; and that lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee
therefrom."1

87

182. Strangely, the ARDC web site provides a document entitled, "Highlights from the New
Illinois Rules of the [sic] Professional Conduct," which is available at https://www.iardc.org/
New%20Rule%20Highlights.pdf, which, under "1) New Rules," includes New Rule 4.4(b),
which is not a "stand-alone" provision, but does not list Rule 6.5 as a "New Rule." Instead, that
document includes Rule 6.5 as number "3)" on its list, while referring to it as "new Rule 6.5."
On the other hand, in its red-lined version of the rules, the ARDC includes the text of New Rule
4.4(b), but excludes the text of New Rule 6.5. See ARDC Clerk's Office, supra note 2.
183. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.18(a) (2010).
184. Id. R. 1.18(b).
185. Id. R. 1.18(c).
186. Id. R. 1.18(d)(1).
187. Id. R. 1.18(d)(2).
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2. Rule 2.4 - Lawyer Serving as a Third-Party Neutral
A lawyer "serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists
two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them." 188
Thus, an arbitrator, a mediator, or the like may be a third-party neutral. A lawyer who is a third-party neutral must make it clear to the
parties that the lawyer is not representing them as their attorney. He
must also explain "the difference between the lawyer's role as a third'189
party neutral and a lawyer's role as one who represents a client.
The extent of this explanation depends on the "particular parties involved and the subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected." 190 An
attorney who represents a party in an alternative dispute resolution
process is governed by the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. 191
If the process "takes place before a tribunal," as defined by new Rule
1.0(m), Rule 3.3 governs the lawyer's duty of candor. 192 Otherwise,
Rule 4.1 governs the lawyer's duty of candor both as to the third-party
neutral and as to other parties. 193
3. Rule 3.9 - Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings
New Rule 3.9 obligates a lawyer who represents a client "before a
legislative body or administrative agency in a nonadjudicative proceeding" to disclose that he or she is appearing in a representative
capacity. 194 In addition the lawyer must conform to Rule 3.3(a), (b)
and (c), and Rule 3.5,195 even if non-lawyers who act as such representatives would not need to do so. 196 According to the pertinent
Comments, these Rules only apply to a lawyer's representation of a
client in connection "with an official hearing or meeting of a governmental agency or a legislative body to which the lawyer or the lawyer's
client is presenting evidence or argument."'1 97 The Rule does not ap-

ply when a lawyer represents a client in "a negotiation or other bilateral transaction with a governmental agency," in an "application for a
license or other privilege," in relation to "the client's compliance with
188. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 2.4(a) (2010).

189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. R. 2.4(b).
Id. R. 2.4 cmt. 3.
Id. R. 2.4 cmt. 5.
Id.

193. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 2.4 cmt. 5 (2010).

194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. R.
Id. R.
Id. R.
Id. R.

3.9(a).
3.9(b).
3.9 cmt. 2.
3.9 cmt. 3.
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generally applicable reporting requirements," or in connection with a
' 198
governmental "investigation or examination of the client's affairs.
4. New Rule 6.5 - Non-Profit and Court-Annexed Limited
Legal Services Programs
Courts, legal service organizations, and other non-profit organizations offer various programs through which lawyers provide shortterm, limited legal services - such as the provision of advice or the
filling out of forms - to aid people with their legal problems without
the lawyers or the people so helped anticipating the creation of an
ongoing relationship.1 99 Nevertheless, even the limited provision of
services creates a client-lawyer relationship. 2°° Many of these programs, "such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se
counseling programs," are operated in such a way that it is not feasible
'20 1
for the lawyers to "systematically screen for conflicts of interest.
Not wanting to unduly reduce the availability of such services, new
Rule 6.5 states that a lawyer who provides such services under the
auspices of such organizations is not subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a)
unless the lawyer actually knows that the representation involves a
conflict of interest. 20 2 Similarly, a lawyer providing these sorts of limited, short-term services is only subject to Rule 1.10 if the lawyer
knows that another member of the lawyer's firm is disqualified under
03
Rule 1.7 or 1.9(a). 2
New Rule 6.5 also limits the scope of Rule 1.10 so that the fact that
a lawyer has provided limited, short-term legal services to one person
through a particular program does not disqualify other members of
the lawyer's firm from representing a client with interests adverse to
other persons being serviced by that program. 20 4 Similarly, Rule 6.5
limits Rule 1.10 so that the fact that one lawyer providing services
under a program is personally disqualified from providing services to
a particular client does not prevent other lawyers participating in the
program from providing services to that client. 20 5
198. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.9 cmt. 3 (2010).

199. Id. R. 6.5 cmt. 1.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. R. 6.5(a)(1).
203. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 6.5(a)(2) (2010).

204. Id. R. 6.5(a)(2); R. 6.5 cmt. 4.
205. Id. R. 6.5.
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Other New Rules According to Their Respective Categories

1. Client-Lawyer Relationship
New Rule 1.4 requires a lawyer to inform a client of facts or circumstances that affect matters as to which the client's informed consent is
required and provides that a lawyer must consult with the client re20 6
garding the means to be used to pursue the client's objectives.
New Rule 1.8 differs from former Rule 1.8 in several important
ways. First, for a lawyer to enter into a business transaction with or
acquire an interest adverse to a current client, new Rule 1.8(a) requires, among other things, that (1) the terms of the transaction or
acquisition be explained in a clearly understandable writing; (2) the
client must be advised of the right to seek independent legal counsel
regarding the matter and given a reasonable opportunity to obtain
such counsel; and (3) the client must give written consent, in a writing
signed by the client, to the essential terms of the matter, and the writing must state whether the lawyer is representing the client in the matter. 20 7 Former Rule 1.8(a) simply required client consent after
disclosure. 208
New Rule 1.8(c) provides not only that a lawyer generally may not
prepare a document, including a testamentary document, that provides the lawyer or certain relatives of the lawyer a substantial gift,
but it also prohibits a lawyer from simply soliciting a substantial gift
for himself or certain relatives. 20 9 Nevertheless, new Rule 1.8(c) continues an exception for cases in which the client and the lawyer (or the
210
recipient of the gift) are closely related.
New Rule 1.10 differs from former Illinois Rule 1.10 by refusing to
impute a particular lawyer's disqualification to the other lawyers in
the firm if the disqualification is "based on a personal interest of the
prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially
limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in
the firm."'211 Where new Rule 1.10 requires consent from affected
persons, the consents do not need to be confirmed in writing.
New Rule 1.13 is especially important to lawyers who represent organizations such as corporations or limited liability companies. First,
it imposes certain duties to report particular types of problems to
higher-ups within the client organization. One such duty arises if the
206. Id. R. 1.4.
207. Id. R. 1.8.
208. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.8(a) (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).

209. ILL. RULES OF
210. Id.
211. Id. R. 1.10(a).

PROF'L CONDUCr

R. 1.8(c) (2010).
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lawyer: (1) knows; (2) that an agent, officer or other person associated
with the organization; (3) intends to act or refuses to act as to a matter
related to the representation; (4) and that the act or refusal constitutes
a crime, fraud or other violation of law; (5) that can reasonably be
imputed to the organization; and (6) will likely cause substantial harm
to the organization.2 1 2 In such a case the lawyer must "proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. ' 213 Specifically, the lawyer must refer the matter to a higher authority within
the organization and, if necessary, to the highest such authority, unless
the lawyer reasonably believes that doing so is not necessary in the
2 14
best interests of the organization.
But suppose the lawyer has fulfilled his obligation of reporting to
the highest authority within the organization, and that authority either
insists upon, or fails to redress, the problematic action or failure to act.
If the action or failure to act is a crime or fraud which the lawyer
reasonably believes is reasonably certain to cause the organization
substantial injury, then Rule 1.13 expressly permits the lawyer to disclose information, including information related to the representation
of the organization, to a person or entity outside of the organization,
but only to the extent that it is necessary to prevent substantial harm
215
to the organization.
New Illinois Rule 1.13 also provides that if a lawyer reasonably believes that he was discharged because he took actions required or permitted by Rule 1.13, the lawyer "shall proceed" as he reasonably
believes necessary to ensure that the organizational client's highest
authority is informed of the discharge. 216 The Rule requires a lawyer
to proceed in the same manner if he withdraws from the representation under circumstances in which new Rule 1.13 requires or permits
2 17
the lawyer to make disclosures.
The merit of Rule 1.14, which addresses a lawyer's responsibility as
to a client with diminished capacity, is questionable. On the one hand,
it explicitly states that a lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule
1.6(a) to disclose otherwise confidential information when taking protective action on behalf of the client.218 But a strong case could be
made that expressly stating this Rule was unnecessary and is of little
advantage. On the other hand, new Rule 1.14 arguably makes it more
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. R. 1.13(b).
Id.
ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R.

Id. R. 1.13(c).
Id. R. 1.13(e).
Id.
Id. R. 1.14(c).

1.13(b) (2010).
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difficult for a lawyer to protect persons of diminished capacity. Former Rule 1.14 permitted a lawyer to take protective action when the
lawyer reasonably believed "that the client cannot adequately act in
the client's own interest. '2 19 New Rule 1.14(b) seems to introduce
additional restrictions: "When the lawyer reasonably believes that the
client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in
the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary
protective action ....,,220 The old formulation of the Rule appears to
authorize action to protect the client from harm without the need to
determine whether that harm was "substantial."
Comment 9 to new Illinois Rule 1.14 differs from Comment 9 to
ABA Model Rule 1.14. Both versions of Comment 9 permit a lawyer
to take action on behalf of a person, "where the health, safety or a
financial interest of a person with seriously diminished capacity is
threatened with imminent and irreparable harm" even if "the person
is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship," so long as the person or someone else "acting in good faith" on the person's behalf "has
consulted the lawyer."' 221 Nevertheless, Comment 9 to ABA Model
Rule 1.14 states that even under such circumstances, a lawyer "should
not act unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the person [with
seriously diminished capacity] has no other lawyer, agent or other representative available. ' 222 Comment 9 to new Illinois Rule 1.14 qualifies this rule, stating that it does not apply "when that representative's
actions or inaction threaten immediate and irreparable harm to the
'223
person.
New Illinois Rule 1.16 eliminates the provision of old Illinois Rule
1.16 that required a lawyer to withdraw if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the client is bringing the legal action "merely
'224
for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person.
The ISBA-CBA Corrected Final Report explains that it is inappropriate for the attorney to withdraw based on the lawyer's judgment regarding the client's "psychological motivation. '225 Nevertheless, new
Illinois Rule 1.16 does state that the lawyer must withdraw if failing to
219. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).

220.

ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

1.14(b) (2010).

221. Id. R. 1.14 cmt. 9; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cnt. 9 (2003).
222. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 9 (2003).
223. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 9 (2010).
224. Id. R. 1.16; ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).
225. ISBA-CBA JoirNT Comm.ON ETmics 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at

22.
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do so will violate other applicable Rules, which would include new
226
Illinois Rule 3.1, which prohibits frivolous actions.
New Illinois Rule 1.16(b)(1) follows ABA Model Rule 1.16(b)(1) by
permitting a lawyer to withdraw, provided the lawyer complies "with
applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when
terminating a representation," if "withdrawal can be accomplished
'227
without material adverse effect on the interests of the client.
Neither Illinois Rule 1.16 nor the Comments thereto address whether
a client's need to pay a new lawyer to become familiar with work that
the first lawyer was already paid for constitutes a material adverse
effect on the interests of the client.
Interestingly, new Illinois Rule 1.16(b)(7), also following ABA
Model Rule 1.16(b)(7), provides that a lawyer may withdraw if "other
good cause for withdrawal exists. '228 Given that the list of reasons
justifying discretionary withdrawal are disjunctive, it therefore appears that "if other good cause for withdrawal exists," new Illinois
Rule 1.16(b)(7) and ABA Model Rule 1.16(b)(7) allow withdrawal
even if withdrawal cannot be accomplished without material adverse
effect on the interests of the client. Of course, new Illinois Rule
1.16(d) and ABA Model Rule 1.16(d) require the lawyer to "take
steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's
interest." 229
New Illinois Rule 1.17 permits the sale of a law practice on four
conditions. First, the entire practice must be sold to one or more lawyers or law firms. Second, the lawyer selling the practice must retire
from the private practice of law in the geographic area in which the
practice was conducted. Third, the sale cannot result in increased fees
being charged to the clients. The fourth condition may be satisfied in
either of two ways. It may be satisfied, for example, by the seller's
giving written notice of the proposed sale to the practice's clients, informing them that they have the right "to retain other counsel or to
take possession of the file" and advising them that "the client's consent to the transfer of the client's files will be presumed if the client
does not take any action or does not otherwise object within ninety
(90) days of receipt of the notice. '2 30 If it is not possible to provide
clients with such notice, then the fourth condition may be satisfied by
226.

ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr

R. 1.16 (2010).

227. Id. R. 1.16(b)(1); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.16(b)(1) (2003).
228. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 1.16(b)(7) (2010); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(7) (2003).
229. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUC R. 1.16(d) (2010); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 1.16(d) (2003).
230. ILL. RULES

OF PROF'L CoNDucr R.

1.17 (2010).
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obtaining an order of a court of competent jurisdiction that authorizes
23 1
the sale.
2.

Counselor

Old Illinois Rule 2.3 permitted a lawyer to provide an evaluation
for a third party if (1) the lawyer reasonably believed that doing so
was "compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with
the client"; and (2) the client consented. 232 New Illinois Rule 2.3 retains the first requirement, but states that the client's "informed consent" is only necessary "[w]hen the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the evaluation is likely to affect the client's interests
materially and adversely. '' 233 Thus, aside from the reference to "informed consent" instead of "consent," Rule 2.3 lowers the requirements for a lawyer's making of an evaluation for a third party.
3.

Advocate (Rules 3.1 to 3.9)

Old Illinois Rule 3.3 imposed duties on a lawyer only when the law'234
yer was "appearing in a professional capacity before a tribunal.
By contrast, new Illinois Rule 3.3 applies to the lawyer in whatever
capacity the lawyer relates to the tribunal, including, for instance, as a
235
witness or as a party.
Old Illinois Rule 3.3 provided no guidance as to when, if at all, the
duties it imposed would terminate. By contrast, new Illinois Rule
3.3(c), following ABA Model Rule 3.3, makes it clear that the lawyer's
duties under new Illinois Rule 3.3(a) and (b) terminate at "the conclu'236
sion of the proceeding.
New Illinois Rule 3.3(a)(1) adds a provision prohibiting a lawyer
from knowingly failing "to correct a false statement of material fact or
law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer. ' 237 Furthermore,
new Illinois Rule 3.3(a)(3) expressly authorizes an attorney to refuse
to offer evidence, other than the client's own testimony as a criminal
defendant, if the lawyer reasonably believes the evidence to be
false.

238

231. Id.
232. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R.
233. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
234. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R.
235. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

236. ILL. RULES
R. 3.3 (2003).
237. ILL. RULES
238. Id. R. 3.3.

2.3 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).

2.3 (2010).
3.3 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).

3.3 (2010).
(2010);

OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c)
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

3.3(a)(1) (2010).
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New Illinois Rule 3.4 specifies a few additional proscriptions not
expressly mentioned in old Illinois Rule 3.4. Thus, it forbids a lawyer:
(1) from knowingly disobeying "an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid
obligation exists;" (2) in pretrial procedure, from making a frivolous
discovery request or from failing to make a reasonably diligent effort
to comply with an adversary's proper discovery request; and (3) in
trial, from (a) alluding to a matter "that the lawyer does not reasonably believe to be relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence"; (b) asserting personal knowledge of facts, other than when
serving as a witness; (c) stating a personal opinion regarding "the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil
'239
litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
New Illinois Rule 3.5 is considerably streamlined, with some provisions moved to other Rules, such as new Illinois Rule 8.4,240 and
others, such as some of the "exceptions" to the prohibition against ex
parte communications, being eliminated.
New Illinois Rule 3.6 regarding trial publicity retains the Illinois
standard that only restricts public statements that "would pose a serious and imminent threat to the fairness" of a proceeding. 241 ABA
Model Rule 3.6, by contrast, uses a standard that is more restrictive of
speech. It prohibits a lawyer from making statements that the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know "will have a substantial likelihood
of materially prejudicing" a proceeding. 242 Old Illinois Rule 3.6(b)
listed examples of statements that would be proscribed under the "serious and imminent threat" standard. 243 New Illinois Rule 3.6 does
244
not contain these examples, but they appear in Comment 5 thereto.
Under old Illinois Rule 3.7, if a lawyer was disqualified because the
lawyer was a witness in a case, the lawyer was completely disqualified.
Not only could the lawyer not serve as an advocate in court, but the
lawyer could not work on the case outside of court either. 245 New
Illinois Rule 3.7, following ABA Model Rule 3.7, only disqualifies
246
such a lawyer from serving as a party's advocate in court.
239. Id. R. 3.4.

240. The rule of old Illinois Rule 3.5(h) dealing with gifts or loans to judges or other court
officials was moved to New Illinois Rule 8.4(f).

241.
242.

ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr

R. 3.6(a) (2010).
3.6 (2003).

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

243. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(b) (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).
244. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 5 (2010).
245. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).

246. ILL.
3.7 (2003).

RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

3.7 (2010);

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
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Old Illinois Rule 3.7 applied different criteria to disqualify a lawyer
based on whether the lawyer was to appear as a witness for the client
or as a witness called by the client's adversary. 247 New Illinois Rule
248
3.7 eliminates this distinction.
New Illinois Rule 3.8 is considerably different from old Illinois Rule
3.8. While old Rule 3.8 imposed duties not only on prosecutors but on
other government lawyers, at least those involved in criminal prosecution, new Illinois Rule 3.8 applies only to prosecutors. 249 The ISBACBA Corrected Final Report states that, "[new Illinois Rule 3.8] differs from the current Illinois rule in being limited to prosecutors, because other government lawyers may not share the prosecutor's
special responsibilities. '250 Given that Illinois had previously taken
the position that other government lawyers did share some basic Rule
3.8 responsibilities, it seems that new Rule 3.8, by retreating from this
position, may represent a step in the wrong direction.
As to prosecutors, however, new Illinois Rule 3.8 adds a number of
specific restrictions. Thus, a prosecutor must make reasonable efforts
to ensure that an accused has been advised of the right to counsel and
of how to obtain counsel and has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to do So. 2 5 1 In addition, a prosecutor must seasonably disclose to
the defense all information known to him that either "tends to negate" the accused's guilt or "mitigates the offense" and, as to sentencing, must disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to him unless a protective order of the
tribunal provides otherwise. 252 New Illinois Rule 3.8 also provides
that a prosecutor may not seek to obtain a waiver of important pre253
trial rights from an unrepresented accused.
New Rule 3.8 also imposes conditions on a prosecutor's ability to
issue a subpoena to a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to testify about a past or present client. Specifically, a prosecutor
may only issue such a subpoena if the prosecutor reasonably believes:
(1) the information sought is not protected by any applicable privilege; (2) the information is essential to a successful investigation or
prosecution; and (3) the information cannot otherwise be feasibly ob247. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).
248. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2010).
249. Compare ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010), with ILL. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 3.8 (2010).

250. ISBA-CBA JOINT COMM. ON ETHics 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at

30 (emphasis added).
251. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L
252. Id. R. 3.8(d).
253. Id. R. 3.8(c).

CONDUCT R.

3.8(b) (2010).
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tained. 25 4 Since 1992, old Illinois Rule 3.8 had contained no restrictions on a prosecutor's issuance of a subpoena in such
255
circumstances.
4.

Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients (Rules 4.1 to 4.4)

New Illinois Rule 4.1 prohibits a lawyer, in the course of representing a client, from knowingly making a false statement of material fact
or law, whereas old Illinois Rule 4.1 forbade a lawyer from making a
statement of material fact or law that the lawyer "knows or reasonably
should know is false. ' 256 Thus, under the new language, if a lawyer
makes a false statement without actually knowing it was false, the lawyer does not violate new Rule 4.1 even though, based on the circumstances, the lawyer should have known the statement was false. Thus,
in this respect, new Rule 4.1 lowers the ethics standards.
New Illinois Rule 4.2 generally prevents a lawyer, in the course of
representing a client in a matter, from communicating about "the matter" with a "person" whom he knows to be represented in the matter. 257 By contrast, old Illinois 4.2 referred to a "party," suggesting the
possibility that the prohibition was restricted only to situations involv25 8
ing litigation.
In addition, new Illinois Rule 4.2 eliminates the rule forbidding a
lawyer from causing "another" to communicate on a particular matter
with a person the lawyer knows to be represented in the matter. Indeed, Comment 4 to new Illinois Rule 4.2 points out that, "[plarties to
a matter may communicate directly with each other, and a lawyer is
not prohibited from advising a client concerning a communication that
the client is legally entitled to make." This new Comment 4, however,
is problematic when it states that, "[a] lawyer may not make a communication prohibited by this Rule through the acts of another. See Rule
8.4(a)." Although the ISBA-CBA Corrected Final Report lauds Comment 4 as clarifying the interrelationship between Rule 4.2 and Rule
8.4(a),25 9 this supposed clarification is illusory. If a lawyer advises a
254. Id. R. 3.8(e).
255. From 1991 to 1992, the Illinois Supreme Court had adopted a rule that required judicial
approval of such a subpoena only after the opportunity of an adversarial hearing on the matter.
After prosecutors objected to this provision, the Court, in 1992, deleted it. ISBA-CBA JOINT
COMM. ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECT-ED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 34.
256. Compare ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCt R. 4.1 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010), with ILL. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2010).
257. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2010).
258. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCt R. 4.2 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).
259. The ISBA-CBA Corrected Final Report states: "Comment [4] explains the appropriate
scope of that concept, pointing out that Rule 8.4(a) prohibits a lawyer's communication through
the acts of another, a matter not stated in current IRPC 8.4. The Comment also clarifies the
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client regarding what the client should or should not say to another
person, it becomes quite difficult to distinguish the client's communication from "a communication" by the lawyer through the acts of the
client.
Comment 7 to new Illinois Rule 4.2 provides specific guidance as to
a lawyer's ability to communicate with present and former constituents of a represented organization. According to Comment 7, Rule
4.2 only "prohibits communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter [in question] or whose act or
omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purpose of civil or criminal liability. ' 260 The Corrected Final Report praises Comment 7 as providing "needed and reasonable
guidance concerning which constituents of a represented organization
are persons represented by counsel under the Rule. Illinois lawyers
currently labor under conflicting interpretations of that issue. ' 26 1 In
fact, however, Comment 7 represents a change from the rule articulated by an Illinois appellate court in FairAutomotive v. Car-X Service
Systems, which only limited a lawyer's communications with a represented organization's "control group. '262 The only conflicting authority cited by the Corrected Final Report was the interpretation of a
federal district court in Illinois. 263 It is possible that the standard articulated in Comment 7 is a good one, but it does seem to represent a
change.
New Illinois Rule 4.3 adds a specific rule that, when a lawyer deals
with an unrepresented person, the lawyer may not give the person
legal advice, other than to obtain counsel, "if the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have
a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the
client. "264
New Illinois Rule 4.4 adds a provision pertaining to situations in
which a lawyer receives a document relating to the representation of a
interplay between the rule and a client's right to communicate with another party." ISBA-CBA
JOINT COMM. ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 31.
260. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2010).
261. ISBA-CBA JOINT Comm. ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at

31.
262. Fair Auto. Repair, Inc. v. Car-X Serv. Sys., Inc., 471 N.E.2d 554, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
263. See ISBA-CBA JOINT COMm. ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note

17, at 31 (citing Weibrecht v. S. Ill. Transfer, Inc., 241 F.3d 875, 881-83 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming
the federal district court's right to interpret its own rules, which had incorporated the Illinois
ethics rules, rather than to be bound by the construction given to those rules by an Illinois
appellate court)).
264. ILL. RULES OF PRO'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2010).
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client and knows that the document was inadvertently sent. 265 Comment 2 explains that the Rule applies also to the receipt of e-mails and
"other electronic modes of transmission. ' 266 Ethics authorities and
commentators in various jurisdictions have reached different opinions
regarding a lawyer's responsibilities in these cases. 267 New Illinois
Rule 4.4 takes a minimalist position, simply requiring that the lawyer
promptly notify the sender that the document was received. 268 Interestingly, Comment 3, which is identical to Comment 3 to ABA Model
Rule 4.4, goes beyond merely providing guidance as to how to interpret the Rule. Instead, it seems to assert a new rule as to a lawyer's
discretion regarding such inadvertently sent documents:
Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for example, when the lawyer learns before receiving the document that it
was inadvertently sent to the wrong address. Where a lawyer is not
required by applicable law to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer. See Rules 1.2 and 1.4.269
5.

Law Firms and Associations (Rules 5.1 to 5.7)

New Illinois Rule 5.1(a) imposes on partners in a firm and on lawyers who, individually or together with others, have managerial authority in a law firm, the duty to take reasonable efforts to ensure that
the firm puts into effect reasonable measures to reasonably ensure
that lawyers in the firm comply with applicable ethics rules. 270 Old
Illinois Rule 5.1(a) placed this duty only on partners. 27 1 The new Rule
properly recognizes that this responsibility should be a consequence of
managerial authority and not only a consequence of the ownership of
a partnership interest.
New Illinois Rule 5.1(c) adds a provision stating that a lawyer with
managerial authority is liable for a violation of the Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct if the lawyer with managerial authority knows
265. Id. R. 4.4(b).
266. Id. R. 4.4 cmt. 2.
267. See, e.g., ISBA-CBA JOINT COMM. ON ETHICS 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra

note 17, at 31 ("[This] issue has generated conflicting opinions about the recipient lawyer's obligations."). Compare ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368
(1992), with Ill. State Bar Assoc., Opinion 98-04 (1999).
268. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010).

269.

ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt.

3 (2010);

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CON-

DUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 3 (2003).

270.

ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

5.1(a) (2010).

271. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).
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be
of the other attorney's conduct at a time when its effects "can 272
avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
Like new Illinois Rule 5.1, new Illinois Rule 5.3 imposes on lawyers
possessing managerial authority in a firm the same responsibilities
that its predecessor imposed only upon lawyers who were partners in
a firm. 273 New Illinois Rule 5.4 permits a lawyer to share "courtawarded fees with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained or
recommended employment of the lawyer. ' 274 New Illinois Rule 5.4
forbids a lawyer from practicing with a professional corporation or
association in which a nonlawyer is a corporate officer and does not
contain old Illinois Rule 5.4's exception regarding situations in which
27 5
a nonlawyer serves as secretary possessing only ministerial duties.
New Illinois Rule 5.5 introduces several new rules regarding the
practice of law in Illinois by lawyers licensed in other states. A lawyer
who is not licensed to practice in Illinois may not hold himself or herself out as licensed to practice in Illinois.276 Nor may such a lawyer
establish an office or any other "systematic presence" in Illinois for
the practice of law. 277 Nevertheless, a lawyer licensed in another
United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law in any jurisdiction, may, in four situations, provide legal services in Illinois on a temporary basis. First, the lawyer may
provide such services in association with another lawyer who is licensed in Illinois and who actively participates in the representation. 278 Second, the lawyer may provide such services if they are in or
"reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal ... if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be
so authorized." 279 Third, the lawyer may provide such services if (a)
they are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential alternative
dispute resolution proceeding, (b) they arise out of or are reasonably
related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is
admitted, and (c) are not legal services for which Illinois requires pro
hac vice admission. 280 Fourth, the lawyer may provide such services if
they are not reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding
272. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(c) (2010).

273. Id. R. 5.3(a).
274. Id. R. 5.4(a)(4).
275. Id. R. 5.4(d).

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. R. 5.5(b)(2).
ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

Id. R. 5.5(c)(1).
Id. R. 5.5(c)(2).
Id. R. 5.5(c)(3).

R. 5.5(b)(1) (2010).
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before a tribunal or to a pending or potential alternative dispute resolution proceeding, if the services "arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyers' practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is
'281
admitted to practice."
Furthermore, new Rule 5.5 provides two bases on which a lawyer
licensed in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law in any jurisdiction, but not admitted to practice law in Illinois, may nonetheless practice law in Illinois
on an ongoing basis. First, the lawyer may do so if the services are
provided to the lawyer's employer and are not services for which Illinois requires pro hac vice admission. 282 Thus, under this Rule, such a
lawyer could provide a variety of legal services to the lawyer's employer, including the drafting of contracts, leases, and other documents, and the conducting of negotiations and the like. In addition,
such a lawyer could provide legal services that the lawyer is authorized to provide in Illinois by virtue of federal or other law. 2 83
New Illinois Rule 5.6 prohibits a lawyer from participating in various types of agreements that would restrict a lawyer's right to practice
law. 284 It differs from old Illinois Rule 5.6 primarily by including several additional types of agreements to the list of agreements that may
285
not restrict a lawyer's right to practice law.
Although both the ISBA-CBA Joint Committee Corrected Final
Report and the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Responsibility Report recommended adoption of ABA Model Rule 5.7, which
addresses "responsibilities regarding law-related services," the Illinois
Supreme Court did not adopt that Rule. 286 Instead, Illinois Rule 5.7 is
"reserved" for possible future action. 2 87
6.

Public Service (Rules 6.1 to 6.5)

Both the ISBA-CBA Joint Committee Corrected Final Report and
the Supreme Court Committee on Professional Responsibility Report

recommended that Illinois not adopt ABA Model Rule
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

6.1.288

The

Id. R. 5.5(c)(4).

R. 5.5(d)(1) (2010).
Id. R. 5.5(d)(2).
Id. R. 5.6.
Compare ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010), with ILL. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2010).
286. See ISBA-CBA JoINr Comm.ON ETHIcs 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note
17, at 161-63; Redmond, supra note 5, at Exhibit B.
ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

287. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2010).
288. See ISBA-CBA JoIrT COMM. ON Emlcs 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note

17, at 164; Redmond, supra note 5, at Exhibit B.
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Illinois Supreme Court accepted this recommendation. Instead, Illinois Rule 6.1 is "reserved" for possible future action. 289 New Illinois
Rules 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 are essentially the same as their predecessors.
New Illinois Rule 6.3, which refers to a lawyer's membership in certain legal service organizations, differs from ABA Model Rule 6.3 in
that the Illinois Rule only permits a lawyer to be a director, officer or
member of a "not-for-profit" legal service organization. 290 Although
the ISBA-CBA Corrected Final Report had recommended adoption
of the ABA Model Rule, which was not restricted to "not-for-profit"
legal service organizations, the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on
Professional Responsibility recommended that the restriction be retained, and the Illinois Supreme Court agreed. 291 New Illinois Rule
292
6.5, which has no predecessor, has already been discussed.
7.

Information About Legal Services (Rules 7.1 to 7.6)

New Illinois Rule 7.1 succinctly states the basic rule against the
making of false or misleading statements regarding a lawyer or a lawyer's services. 293 New Illinois Rule 7.1 is shorter than its predecessor,
because some of the specific rules that were included in old Illinois
Rule 7.1 now appear in the Comments to new Illinois Rule 7.1.294
New Illinois Rule 7.2, as to advertising, broadly permits advertising
through "written, recorded or electronic communication. '295 The new
Rule importantly eliminates the obligation to maintain a copy or recording of any advertisement or written communication for three
years after its last dissemination. In an era when a website might constitute such a "communication" and every change to the website might
constitute a new "communication," such a record-keeping requirement could easily be overwhelming. Yet new Illinois Rule 7.2 contains another "leniency" which might be questionable. Old Illinois
Rule 7.2 required that every advertisement had to contain the name of
at least one attorney responsible for its content. 296 New Illinois Rule
7.2 requires that each advertisement contain "the name and office ad289. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2010).
290. Compare ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.3 (2010), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 6.3 (2003).
291. See ISBA-CBA JorNT COMM. ON ETHics 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note

17, at 168; Redmond, supra note 5, at Exhibit B.
292. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
293. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2010).
294. Compare ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010), with ILL. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

295.

7.1 (2010).

ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.

7.2(a) (2010).

296. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010).

80

DEPAUL BusINEss & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:29

dress of at least one lawyer or law firm responsible for its content. '2 97
Thus, it is sufficient if the advertisement contains the name and address of the law firm, and not of any individual lawyers. This may
make it more difficult to hold individual lawyers accountable for advertisements that violate the Rules. New Illinois Rule 7.2(b)(4) pro298
vides for the possibility of reciprocal referral agreements.
New Illinois Rule 7.3 does not permit in-person, live telephone, or
real-time electronic solicitations of professional employment from a
prospective client unless the prospective client is a lawyer or "has a
family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with the lawyer. ' ' 299 In addition, it requires that every written, recorded or electronic solicitation from a lawyer to a prospective client "known to be
in need of legal services in a particular matter shall include the words
'Advertising Material' on the outside envelope," unless the prospective client is a lawyer, or has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with the lawyer. 3°° Nevertheless, new Illinois Rule
7.3 permits a lawyer to participate in a prepaid or group legal service
plan if it is operated by an organization not owned or directed by the
lawyer that does use in-person or telephone contact "to solicit memberships or subscriptions for the plan from persons who are not
known to need legal services in a particular matter covered by the
plan."301
New Illinois Rule 7.4 differs from ABA Model Rule 7.4 in several
respects. For example, it does not permit the use of terms "certified,"
"specialist," "expert," or the like even to identify "any certificates,
awards or recognitions issued by any agency, governmental or private,
or any group, organization or association" unless two conditions are
satisfied.30 2 First, the reference must be truthful, verifiable and not
misleading. 303 Second, the reference must include a statement "that
the Supreme Court of Illinois does not recognize certifications of specialties in the practice of law and that the certificate, award or recognition is not a requirement to practice law in Illinois. ' 30 4 In adopting a
version of new Illinois Rule 7.4 that does not permit a lawyer practicing trademark law to use the designation "Trademark attorney," and
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr

R. 7.2(c) (2010).

Id. R. 7.2(b)(4).
Id. R. 7.3(a)(2).
Id. R. 7.3(c).
Id. R. 7.3(d).

302. Compare ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 7.4 (2010), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDucT R. 7.4 (2003).
303. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.4(c)(1) (2010).

304. Id. R. 7.4(c)(2).
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that does not permit a lawyer engaged in admiralty law to use the
designation "Proctor in Admiralty," or the like, the Illinois Supreme
Court followed the recommendation of its Committee on Professional
30 5
Responsibility rather than the Corrected Final Report.
8.

Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession (Rules 8.1 to 8.5)

New Illinois Rule 8.1 forbids bar admission applicants and lawyers,
in connection with a bar admission application or a disciplinary matter, from knowingly making a false statement of material fact, from
failing to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension the
person knows to have arisen, and from knowingly failing to respond to
a lawful demand for information by admissions or disciplinary authorities. 30 6 New Illinois Rule 8.1 differs from old Illinois Rule 8.1, which
30 7
only required disclosure to correct a "material" misapprehension.
In addition, new Illinois Rule 8.1 eliminates the old Illinois Rule 8.1
language providing that an attorney may not "further the application
for admission to the bar of another person known by the lawyer to be
unqualified in respect to character, education, or any other relevant
308
attribute."
New Illinois Rule 8.5 expands the disciplinary jurisdiction of Illinois
so that it applies to a lawyer who is not licensed to practice law in
Illinois if the lawyer provides legal services in Illinois.3 0 9 Comment 1
to new Illinois Rule 8.5 differs from Comment 1 to ABA Model Rule
8.5. The Illinois Comment is worded so as to eliminate the suggestion
'310
"that parallel reciprocal discipline should be automatic.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois Bar, generally, have
largely refused to accept moral responsibility for the ethics rules governing the practice of law. Disappointingly, they have implicitly delegated their responsibility to the ABA. In following the ABA's lead,
they failed to justify many of their decisions. They even failed to acknowledge many of their decisions by misrepresenting the significance
305. See ISBA-CBA JoINrr COMM. ON ETHmics 2000, CORRECTED FINAL REPORT, supra note

17, at 179; Redmond, supra note 5, at Exhibit B.
306. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (2010).
307. Compare ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010), with ILL. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (2010).
308. CompareILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (repealed Jan. 1, 2010), with ILL. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (2010).
309. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (2010).
310. Compare ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmt. 1 (2010), with MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmt. 1 (2003).
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of the official comments that were adopted. In addition, the Illinois
Supreme Court adopted standards that fell short of those established
by the ABA. Very disturbingly, throughout this lengthy process, the
Illinois Supreme Court failed to exhibit the initiative to adopt a number of important measures that could have provided increased ethical
guidance to Illinois attorneys and law students.

